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ARTICLES
PRISON  IS  PRISON
Brooke D. Coleman*
Two indigent men stand before two separate judges.  Both will be sent to prison if they lose
their cases.  One receives appointed counsel, but the other does not.  This discrepancy seems terri-
bly unjust, yet the Supreme Court has no problem with it.  It recently affirmed in Turner v.
Rogers, that where an indigent individual is subject to criminal charges that can result in
incarceration, he has a right to appointed counsel, but where an indigent individual is subject to
civil proceedings where incarceration is a consequence, he does not.  In other words, criminal and
civil proceedings have different rules, and the right to appointed counsel is no exception.  This
Article argues that because the consequence of these proceedings is exactly the same, the right to
appointed counsel should be the same.  Prison is prison.  This consequence, and not just doctri-
nal distinctions, should guide the Court’s analysis in deciding whether an indigent individual
receives appointed counsel.  By systematically examining the Court’s narratives in both criminal
and civil right-to-counsel cases, this Article seeks to determine why the Court continues to treat the
same situation so differently.  The Court states that it is driven solely by doctrine, but it uses
radically different language to discuss the individuals, attorneys, and nature of the proceedings
in the criminal versus civil setting.  This Article argues that the Court’s different goals in the
criminal and civil context better explain the Court’s approach than doctrinal distinctions alone.
With criminal cases, its goal is legitimacy, while with civil cases, its primary goal is efficiency.
This Article questions the Court’s “doctrine-oriented” approach in the civil context, and argues
that what the Court is really doing is allowing its treatment of cases in the broader civil justice
system to affect its jurisprudence in this context.  It does this even when the consequence of a
typical civil case is so different.  After all, the result in a case like Turner is prison, not monetary
damages or injunctive relief.  Instead of taking this doctrine-oriented approach, this Article
argues that the Court’s analysis should be “consequence-driven.”  Where prison is the conse-
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quence, the Court’s underlying analysis of right to counsel should be the same whether the pro-
ceeding is criminal or civil.  Using the Court’s decision in Turner, the Article shows how a
consequence-driven approach could have changed the result in that case.
INTRODUCTION
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.  Even the intelligent and edu-
cated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. . . . He
requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against
him.1
The introduction of counsel into a . . . proceeding will alter significantly the
nature of the proceeding. . . . Certainly, the decisionmaking process will be
prolonged, and the financial cost to the State . . . will not be insubstantial.2
Two men stand before judges in two separate courtrooms.  They are
indigent so they cannot afford a lawyer.  Each judge decides that counsel
should not be appointed to them and proceeds to hold their hearings.  They
are each sentenced to a year in prison for their alleged offenses.  After sen-
tencing, they each find pro bono attorneys and appeal their cases to the
Supreme Court.  In the case of the first man, the Court determines that the
failure of the trial court to provide counsel was fatal.  After all, “[c]ounsel is
needed so that the accused may know precisely what he is doing, so that he is
fully aware of the prospect of going to jail or prison, and so that he is treated
fairly . . . .”3  In the case of the second man, however, the result is markedly
different.  There, the Court rejects the requirement of counsel, holding that
the issue in his case was “sufficiently straightforward to warrant determina-
tion” without the help of an attorney.4  How is it that two men—subject to
the same prison sentence—can be treated so differently?  The answer is sur-
prisingly simple.  One has been criminally charged while the other is subject
to a civil proceeding.
This Article is the first to argue that prison is prison5—that the conse-
quences of criminal and civil proceedings, not any facial differences between
the two, should govern whether the right to counsel attaches.  It fills a gap in
the literature on Civil Gideon6 to show that the Court’s justification for treat-
1 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932).
2 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787–88 (1973).
3 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34 (1972).
4 Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2519 (2011).
5 “Prison” is a place of confinement for individuals incarcerated for longer periods of
time, while “jail” is a place of confinement for individuals incarcerated for shorter periods,
often by local jurisdictions.  Sharon Dolovich, Strategic Segregation in the Modern Prison, 48
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 4 n.14 (2011).  The Article uses the term “prison” generally to refer to
any sentence of incarceration, including prison, jail, detention, and related terms.
6 “Civil Gideon” is the name given to a broad court-based and legislative movement
arguing that when indigent individuals’ basic human needs are at stake, appointed counsel
should be provided.  Dennis A. Kaufman, The Tipping Point on the Scales of Civil Justice, 25
TOURO L. REV. 347, 366 n.44 (2009).
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ing criminal and civil cases differently does not rest on solid ground.  This
Article systematically examines the narratives the Court uses regarding right
to counsel in the civil and criminal context.  By laying out the Court’s diamet-
rically-opposed language, this Article confronts how differently the Court
describes what lawyers contribute to the adjudication process.  This Article
argues that the Court must know that it is being inconsistent, but it accepts
this inconsistency as the necessary means to achieve different results in the
two regimes.  On the criminal side, the Court is primarily concerned with
ensuring the system is legitimate.  On the civil side, however, the Court is
concerned with efficiency.  These end results—legitimacy in the criminal
context and efficiency in the civil one—drive the Court’s persistent use of
opposing narratives in what are otherwise identical situations.
Gideon v. Wainright,7 and the foundational right to counsel it created,
will celebrate its fiftieth anniversary this year; yet, an untold number of indi-
gent individuals in the civil justice system will have nothing to celebrate.  The
Court recently confirmed in Turner v. Rogers that indigent individuals in civil
cases have no right to counsel, even when prison is the consequence.8  The
Court’s reasoning is based on doctrinal differences—distinctions driven by
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.  However, many scholars have
argued that the reasoning for providing counsel in the criminal context
equally applies in the civil one.9  The issues in civil cases can be complex and
7 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
8 Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2512.  As will be discussed in Part III.D, Mr. Turner was an
indigent man who was imprisoned for serial terms of up to a year each because of his
failure to pay child support. Id. at 2513.  The implications of his case are far broader than
child support, however.  Imprisonment resulting from civil proceedings is on the rise. See
Ethan Bronner, Poor Land in Jail as Companies Add Huge Fees for Probation, N.Y. TIMES, July 3,
2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/03/us/probation-fees-multiply-
as-companies-profit.html?pagewanted=all (examining how private companies hired by
municipalities to collect outstanding fees for minor infractions are pursuing jail sentences
for individuals who fail to pay those fines); Ethan Bronner, Right to Lawyer Can Be Empty
Promise for Poor, N.Y. TIMES, March 16, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/03/16/us/16gideon.html?ref=ethanbronner&_r=0 (discussing how Gideon did not
extend to civil matters, meaning that many poor people are without counsel in cases involv-
ing foreclosure, civil contempt, and spousal abuse); Susan An, Unpaid Bills Land Some Debt-
ors Behind Bars (National Public Radio broadcast Dec. 12, 2011), available at http://www.
npr.org/2011/12/12/143274773/unpaid-bills-land-some-debtors-behind-bars (examining
how individuals are increasingly being imprisoned for failure to pay outstanding debts
owed to private companies).
9 See, e.g., Simran Bindra & Pedram Ben-Cohen, Public Civil Defenders: A Right to Coun-
sel for Indigent Civil Defendants, 10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2003) (arguing for a
civil public defenders’ office because indigent individuals need protection and access);
Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal About
When Counsel Is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37, 44–46 (2010) (examining data in
different substantive areas to determine when counsel is helpful and when individuals
might be better off with self-representation); Robert Hornstein, The Right to Counsel in Civil
Cases Revisited: The Proper Influence of Poverty and the Case for Reversing Lassiter v. Department
of Social Services, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 1057, 1062 (2010) (arguing that the Court’s deci-
sions in civil right to counsel cases turn on misplaced attitudes regarding “undeserving
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the interests at stake significant.10  What has yet to be critically examined is
why—beyond doctrinal distinctions—the Court uses such a different
approach, and importantly, such different narratives when it confronts the
right to counsel in the criminal context versus the civil one.  This Article
argues that the Court’s reasoning is affected by its general civil justice juris-
prudence.  The push for efficiency in traditional civil litigation has resulted
in the Court’s distrust of the civil justice system and its lawyers as well as
significant concern regarding cost.  Instead of taking this “doctrine-oriented”
approach, this Article argues the Court should be “consequence-driven.”
Where prison is the ultimate consequence, there is simply no justification for
treating the right to counsel differently.
Part I of this Article explains the doctrinal differences between the right
to counsel in the criminal and civil settings.  Part II exposes the variant narra-
tives the Court uses when it describes why lawyers might or might not be
necessary to criminal and civil proceedings.  This Part also examines why the
Court uses different language about the proceedings, the individual, and the
value of lawyers when discussing the right to counsel in the civil context ver-
sus the criminal one.  It argues that the Court’s use of doctrine-oriented lan-
guage in civil incarceration cases is driven by its treatment of cases in the
broader civil justice system.  That treatment has affected all civil litigation,
including proceedings where prison, not monetary damages, is the result.
Part III introduces the Court’s recent decision in Turner v. Rogers.  It argues
that the Court chose to adhere to a doctrine-oriented approach even when
Mr. Turner was repeatedly subject to significant incarceration.  Next, in Part
IV, this Article argues that the Court should have used a consequence-driven
approach.  When incarceration is the consequence, the Court should analyze
the issue of right to counsel in a similar fashion without regard to whether
poor” populations); Paul Marvy & Laura Klein Abel, Current Developments in Advocacy to
Expand the Civil Right to Counsel, 25 TOURO L. REV 131, 131–32 (2009) (summarizing recent
state initiatives and laws requiring appointment of counsel for indigent individuals in a
variety of settings, including child custody and housing disputes).
10 See Bindra & Ben-Cohen, supra note 9, at 16–18 (arguing that the complexities of R
criminal proceedings are similar to those involved in civil ones); Hornstein, supra note 9, at R
1104 (arguing for a right to counsel “because the lack of access to counsel strips the right
to be heard of much of its meaning in the context of a civil justice system that is procedur-
ally complex and structured around an attorney-client representational model”).  In
response to this mounting criticism, the ABA House of Delegates adopted a resolution to
find a way “to provide legal counsel as a matter of right at public expense to low income
persons in those categories of adversarial proceedings where basic human needs are at
stake, such as those involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health or child custody.”  Report
to the House of Delegates, A.B.A. RES. 112A (2006), available at http://www.legalaidnc.
org/public/participate/legal_services_community/ABA_Resolution_onehun-
dredtwelvea[1].pdf; see also Robert S. Catz & Nancy Lee Firak, The Right to Appointed Counsel
in Quasi-Criminal Cases: Towards an Effective Assistance of Counsel Standard, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 397 (1984) (arguing that, based on logic for right to counsel in criminal cases, the
right should be expanded to civil cases that are “quasi-criminal”).  While Catz and Firak
noted the similarities in the issues presented in criminal and so-called quasi-criminal cases,
they did not explore why the Court persisted in maintaining distinctions between the two.
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the party is subject to criminal or civil proceedings.  This Article then uses
the Turner decision as an example of how a consequence-driven approach
would have resulted in the Court finding a right to counsel in that case.
Finally, in Part V, this Article addresses the concerns attendant to a conse-
quence-driven approach and argues that even with these concerns, such an
approach is justified.
I. HISTORY OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN THE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CONTEXT
There are a number of differences between criminal and civil proceed-
ings, both substantively and procedurally.11  This Articles focuses on what is a
considerable keystone of our criminal justice system, yet a largely nonexistent
aspect of our civil justice system—the right to assistance of counsel for indi-
gent individuals.  The Court’s recent decision in Turner v. Rogers brings the
issue of assistance of counsel in the criminal versus civil setting to the fore.12
Before discussing the Court’s decision in that case and how it relates to the
Court’s decisions in the criminal setting, this Article briefly explains the his-
tory of how the right to counsel has developed in both the criminal and civil
settings.
A. Criminal: The Sixth Amendment
The right to counsel in federal courts under the Sixth Amendment13 was
well-established by the 1930s.14  The Court was reticent to incorporate the
Sixth Amendment and apply it to the states, however.15  A case in the early
1930s indicated the Court might be willing to move in that direction.  In
Powell v. Alabama,16 nine young African American men were charged with
raping two white teenage girls.17  The men were tried in state court and sen-
tenced to death.18  The trial court never asked whether they could procure
11 For example, there is a right to a jury trial in criminal cases at both the state and
federal level, yet the Seventh Amendment does not apply to the states, so no similar right
exists in states in the civil context.  Suja A. Thomas, Nonincorporation: The Bill of Rights After
McDonald v. Chicago, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 159, 162 (2012).
12 See infra Part III.
13 The Sixth Amendment provides,
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed; which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
14 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); see also Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 474
(1942) (Black, J. dissenting) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment makes the right to counsel in crim-
inal cases inviolable by the Federal Government.”).
15 See infra notes 23–33 and accompanying text. R
16 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (often referred to as the “Scottsboro Boys” case).
17 Id. at 49.
18 Id. at 50.
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counsel and only assigned them counsel on the day of trial.19  The Court
addressed whether these men were denied the right to counsel in violation of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.20
The Court determined that their due process rights had been violated,
stating:
[I]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is
incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, fee-
ble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether
requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due
process of law; and that duty is not discharged by an assignment at such a
time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in
the preparation and trial of the case.21
Following Powell, the question was whether the Court’s holding would be
expanded to all state criminal trials.  The Powell Court was explicit about lim-
iting the case to its facts and specifically to the Fourteenth Amendment, but
it left the door open for future cases.22 Betts v. Brady, decided in 1942, put an
end to that conjecture.23
In that case, Betts was arrested and indicted for robbery in a Maryland
state court.24  Betts requested an attorney, but his request was denied
because under state law indigent defendants were appointed counsel only
when they were charged with murder or rape.25  Betts represented himself,
was found guilty, and was sentenced to eight years in prison.26  Betts argued
that the court’s refusal to appoint counsel violated his due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment.27  The Court refused to extend Powell to
find that “in every case, whatever the circumstances, one charged with crime,
who is unable to obtain counsel, must be furnished counsel by the State.”28
While the Court acknowledged that the Sixth Amendment required the
appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in federal court, it noted
that considerations under the Fourteenth Amendment were significantly dif-
ferent.29  By looking at the legislative and constitutional history of each of
the states, the Court concluded that most states did not require the appoint-
19 Id. at 52, 54–56.
20 Id. at 50, 52.
21 Id. at 71.  The Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant part, “No state shall . . .
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
22 Powell, 287 U.S. at 71 (“Whether this [finding of a denial of due process within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment] would be so in other criminal prosecutions, or
under other circumstances, we need not determine.”).
23 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
24 Id. at 456.
25 Id. at 457.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 461.
28 Id. at 462.
29 Id. at 465.
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ment of counsel.30  The Court surmised that “in the great majority of the
States, it has been the considered judgment of the people, their representa-
tives and their courts that appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right,
essential to a fair trial.”31  Thus, the Betts Court did not incorporate the Sixth
Amendment.32  It left the determination of right to counsel in the hands of
the state judges and legislatures.33
Over twenty years later, the Court revisited Betts in the seminal case of
Gideon v. Wainright.34  Clarence Gideon was arrested for breaking and enter-
ing with the intent to commit a misdemeanor, a felony under Florida law.35
When he appeared before the trial court, Gideon requested an attorney
because he could not afford one.36  The trial judge informed him that state
law only required the appointment of counsel when the defendant was
charged with a capital offense.37  Gideon represented himself at trial, was
found guilty, and later sought habeas relief.38  The Court took the opportu-
nity to re-examine its decision in Betts and decided that the case should be
overruled.39  The Court argued that Betts was the outlier in its jurisprudence
regarding right to counsel in criminal cases because it had “departed from
the sound wisdom” of Powell.40  In order to “assure fair trials before impartial
tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law,” the Court
determined that all defendants—not just those who have the means neces-
sary—should be provided with a lawyer.41
Gideon was initially limited to defendants charged with felony crimes.
However, Argersinger v. Hamlin expanded the right to indigent defendants no
matter the level of alleged crime.42  In that case, the indigent defendant was
tried for carrying a concealed weapon, a misdemeanor under Florida law
punishable with a six-month sentence, $1,000, or both.43  The Court deter-
mined as long as defendants were potentially subject to prison, indigent
defendants had a fundamental right to assistance of counsel.44
Under these decisions, states were required to provide counsel to indi-
gent defendants charged criminally.  This requirement has had a significant
impact on the criminal justice system.  According to a 1997 study, “seventy-
30 Id. at 465–72.
31 Id. at 471.
32 Id. at 471–72.
33 Id. at 472.  In Betts’s case, the Court determined he received a fair trial and did not
require counsel. Id. at 472–73.
34 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
35 Id. at 336.
36 Id. at 337.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 337–38.
39 Id. at 338, 345.
40 Id. at 345.
41 Id. at 344.
42 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972).
43 Id. at 26.
44 Id. at 40.
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five percent of defendants facing criminal charges in state court, and sixty
percent of those facing criminal charges in federal court, had a publicly
financed attorney.”45  The criminal justice system, and those who are defend-
ants within it, largely rely on the right to counsel cemented in Gideon.46
B. Civil: The Fourteenth Amendment
One of the first cases to assess whether indigent individuals should
receive counsel in the civil setting was In re Gault.47  In that case, a fifteen
year-old boy was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent without the assistance of
counsel.48  In Gault, the question was whether the rights attendant to crimi-
nal defendants applied in juvenile proceedings, which are civil in nature, but
45 Laura K. Abel, A Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: Lessons from Gideon v. Wainright, 15
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 527, 538 (2006).
46 However, the fact that defendants use government-provided attorneys in such great
numbers does not mean that the system is a perfect one.  There are many successes, such
as better training for defense attorneys and better monitoring systems for quality control.
Abel, supra note 45, at 539.  Yet, there have been failures as well. Id. at 540–41.  In some R
states, the attorneys defending criminals are not trained in criminal law, or worse, have
been sanctioned or disbarred for their general ineptitude. Id. at 541.  The overwhelming
caseloads appointed attorneys are expected to carry, and the related issues of less time to
spend with clients and the incentive to plead out quickly, are chronic problems. Id. Many
of these problems result from a startling lack of funding for indigent defense. Id. at
541–42; see also Benjamin Barton, Against Civil Gideon (And for Pro Se Court Reform), 62 FLA.
L. REV. 1227, 1251–52 (2010).  According to Deborah Rhode, “The United States spends
about a hundred billions dollars annually on criminal justice, but only about 2 to 3 percent
goes to indigent defense.” DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 123 (2004).  And, state
governments do not fare any better.  Barton, supra, at 1252–53.  These challenges have, no
doubt, had an impact on the legitimacy that the Court’s decisions sought to establish for
the criminal justice system. Id. at 1262 (“Psychological studies have shown that when a
litigant does not feel ‘heard’ in a legal process, they perceive the entire process as funda-
mentally unfair.”).  In the face of these challenges, various policy steps are being taken,
and some of those attempts are succeeding.  Abel, supra note 45, at 542–50.  For example,
organizations like the American Bar Association have adopted specific guidelines regard-
ing maximum caseloads. Id. at 547.  To the extent these are observed by particular juris-
dictions, they can be incredibly useful. Id.  At the end of the day, the criminal justice
system is lauded for providing attorneys to indigent defendants, but to say that the system is
without problems would be misleading.  Nonetheless, the legitimacy of the system—in the
broader public opinion—is higher because all defendants have the right to legal represen-
tation. BELDEN RUSSONELLO & STEWART, DEVELOPING A NATIONAL MESSAGE FOR INDIGENT
DEFENSE: ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL SURVEY 30 (October 2001), available at http://www.nlada.
org/DMS/Documents/1211996548.53/Polling%20results%20report.pdf (revealing survey
results that show strong support among citizens surveyed for providing legal help to people
who need it but cannot afford it).  It goes without saying that individual defendants in the
criminal justice system often do not find the system to be legitimate.
47 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
48 Id. at 4.
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can result in a child being incarcerated until the age of twenty-one.49  The
Court determined that even though the proceeding was civil,
[t]he juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law,
to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the pro-
ceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and
submit it.  The child requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in
the proceedings against him.50
The Court noted that while the probation officer was there with the child, he
was there as an adversary on behalf of the state.51  Moreover, the judge could
not represent the child.52  The Court found that there was no real difference
between juvenile proceedings and criminal proceedings against adults
because the delinquency hearing was comparable to a criminal trial.53  Thus,
the Court determined that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment required both the notification of right to counsel and the provision of
counsel if the child could not afford it.54
Following Gault, one could argue that even when a proceeding was nom-
inally civil, if it was functionally equivalent to an adversarial hearing and
could result in one’s loss of liberty, then basic rights conferred by due pro-
cess—rights like assistance of counsel—should attach.  That argument was
largely rejected in Gagnon v. Scarpelli.55  In Scarpelli, the defendant was on
probation from a fifteen year suspended sentence when he was allegedly
caught in the midst of a burglary.56  He admitted to the burglary, and his
probation was revoked by the probation board without a hearing and without
consultation with counsel.57  His fifteen-year sentence was reinstated.58  He
challenged the revocation of his probation by arguing that the lack of assis-
tance of counsel violated his due process rights.59  The Court rejected a pre-
sumption that counsel should always be appointed to an indigent
probationer during a revocation hearing.60  As opposed to the probation
officer in Gault, the Court found the officer’s duty in the revocation hearing
could be supportive.61  The Court also looked at the hearing’s procedural
protections, including written notice of the claim, an opportunity to confront
and cross-examine witnesses, and a “neutral” fact-finder.62  After weighing
49 Id. at 34–37.
50 Id. at 36 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
51 Id. at 36.
52 Id.
53 Id.; see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789 n.12 (1973) (noting that delinquency
proceedings are “functionally akin to a criminal trial”).
54 Gault, 387 U.S. at 41.
55 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
56 Id. at 779–80.
57 Id. at 780.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 781.
61 Id. at 785.
62 Id. at 786.
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the nature of the hearing, the role of the probationer’s representatives, and
the procedural safeguards, the Court rejected a categorical right to counsel
in this context.63  Instead, it adopted a case-by-case approach, requiring that
each hearing board assess whether counsel is required.64
In Vitek v. Jones, the Court once again addressed whether a prisoner has a
right to counsel when his status changed.65  Instead of probation, the ques-
tion in Vitek was whether a prisoner being transferred from prison to a state
mental health institution had a right to counsel.66  Jones was convicted of
robbery and sentenced to up to nine years.67  After setting fire to his mat-
tress, mental health officials recommended he be placed in a mental hospi-
tal.68  Jones challenged this decision, arguing that he should have received
notice, a hearing, and appointed counsel before being transferred from
prison to the hospital.69
The Court, in Vitek v. Jones, applied the balancing test announced in
Mathews v. Eldridge to determine whether due process required the appoint-
ment of counsel.70  Under Mathews, the Court balances the individual’s pri-
vate interests against the government’s interest, and then weighs both against
the risk of erroneous deprivation of the individual’s rights.71  First, the Court
recognized that commitment to a mental institution implicated meaningful
liberty interests because of both the confinement and the social stigma of
being committed.72  The Court also found that the government officials’
interests were strong because of the need to protect their officials and other
inmates from mentally ill prisoners.73  Finally, the Court found that the risk
of error in these commitment proceedings was high, given these interests.74
However, the majority split on the question of right to counsel with only four
of the Justices voting to require counsel for indigent prisoners in this con-
text.75  Justice Powell, the fifth Justice in the judgment, argued that a
licensed attorney did not need to be appointed as long as someone with med-
63 Id. at 788.
64 Id. at 790–91.  In Scarpelli’s case, the Court determined he might require assistance
of counsel. Id. at 791.  His admission that he had committed another serious crime,
according to the Court, was a situation where counsel would not ordinarily be necessary.
Id.  Because Scarpelli had since denied that he made such an admission, however, the
Court held that the decision to deny him assistance of counsel should be re-examined in
light of the Court’s decision. Id.
65 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
66 Id. at 482–83.  The Court also looked at whether he was entitled to other procedural
protections such as notice and a hearing. Id. at 483.
67 Id. at 484.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 484–85.
70 Id. at 499.
71 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976)
72 Vitek, 445 U.S.at 491–92.
73 Id. at 495.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 496–97.
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ical expertise could assist the prisoner.76  Due process, according to Justice
Powell, did not require lawyers; it required only “qualified and independent
assistance.”77
The final case in this collection of “civil” cases preceding Turner78 did
not involve a liberty interest, but instead involved the termination of a
mother’s parental rights.  Lassiter v. Department of Social Services79 is an impor-
tant case, however, because the language the Court used to reject a right to
counsel in the Lassiter case indicated that when and if a case like Turner came
before it, the Court would find a right to counsel.80
Abby Gail Lassiter had a number of children, but one of her youngest,
William, required additional medical care.81  The doctors at the hospital
responsible for William’s care referred Lassiter’s case to the Durham County
Department of Social Services.82  William was in state custody when Lassiter
was charged and convicted of second-degree murder.83  Following her con-
viction, the Department of Social Services moved to terminate Lassiter’s
parental rights.84  When she appeared at the termination hearing, Lassiter
did not have counsel, nor did she ask for one or allege that she was indi-
gent.85  The court terminated Lassiter’s parental rights and she appealed
that decision.86  She argued she was indigent and, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, was entitled to assistance of counsel.87
The Court determined that due process did not require the appoint-
ment of counsel in every parental rights termination case.88  It weighed her
interest in her children highly, calling it “commanding,” and it valued the
state’s interest in the welfare of the child as high, but it admitted that the cost
to the state for providing counsel in these kinds of hearings was fairly low.89
Thus, the Court’s analysis turned on the risk of error.90  The Court then
made two important moves.  First, it held that Scarpelli’s case-by-case
approach applied.91  While the Court acknowledged that the risk of error in
parental right termination hearings could be “insupportably high,” it
76 Id. at 499–500 (Powell, J., concurring) (“In sum, although the State is free to
appoint a licensed attorney to represent an inmate, it is not constitutionally required to do
so.  Due process will be satisfied so long as an inmate facing involuntary transfer to a
mental hospital is provided qualified and independent assistance.”).
77 Id. at 500.
78 Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011).
79 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
80 See id. at 25.
81 Id. at 20.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 20–21.
84 Id. at 21.
85 Id. at 21–22.
86 Id. at 23–24.
87 Id. at 24.
88 Id. at 33.
89 Id. at 27–28.
90 Id. at 28.
91 Id. at 31–32 (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788 (1973)).
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rejected a blanket rule and instead opted for a case-specific approach.92  Sec-
ond, it looked at the merits of Lassiter’s case and determined that “the pres-
ence of counsel for Ms. Lassiter could not have made a determinative
difference.”93  In other words, Lassiter’s case was so bad, not even an attorney
could have changed the result.94
The rejection of a right to counsel in this context was not altogether
shocking given the Court’s jurisprudence up to this point.  What stood out in
the Lassiter opinion, however, was the Court’s recitation of the background
law, which included a discussion of right to counsel in both the civil and
criminal context.95  When the Court turned to its decisions in the civil con-
text, it stated that in cases where it had found a right to counsel (Gault and
Vitek), the key was the potential loss of liberty.96  The Court stated that it was
the “defendant’s interest in personal freedom, and not simply the special
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments right to counsel in criminal cases, which
triggers the right to appointed counsel . . . .”97  The Court added that given
these precedents, there is a “presumption that an indigent litigant has a right
to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physi-
cal liberty.”98  In the criminal context, the Court similarly noted that the
right to counsel only kicked in when there was a loss of liberty and not when
the defendant might be required to pay only a fine.99
The Court’s discussion in Lassiter indicated that the issue of appointed
counsel turned not on doctrinal distinctions between criminal and civil pro-
ceedings, but instead on whether an individual’s personal freedom was at
stake. Turner v. Rogers100 recently presented this very issue to the Court.
Michael Turner was required to make child support payments under a court
order.101  Whenever he violated that order, he was held in civil contempt and
repeatedly incarcerated for up to a year at a time.102  Turner, an indigent
92 Id.
93 Id. at 32–33.  As to criminal cases, the Court discussed Betts, Gideon, and Argersinger.
Id. at 25.
94 For an excellent detailed account of Lassiter’s case, see Elizabeth G. Thornburg,
Adversarial—The Story of Lassiter: The Importance of Counsel in an Adversary System, in CIVIL
PROCEDURE STORIES 509 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008); see also Brooke D. Coleman,
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services: Why is it Such a Lousy Case?, 12 NEV. L.J. 591
(2012) (arguing that Lassiter was the worst Supreme Court case).
95 See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 26–27.
99 Id. at 26 (citing Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979)).  The Court also argued
that “as a litigant’s interest in personal liberty diminishes, so does his right to appointed
counsel.” Id. at 26 (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973)).  In Scarpelli, the
prisoner by virtue of his conviction and incarceration had a conditional liberty interest.  See
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 781–82. Thus, the loss of personal freedom was not absolute and did
not require appointed counsel in that case.  Id.
100 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011).
101 Id. at 2513.
102 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-5\NDL513.txt unknown Seq: 13  2-JUL-13 14:30
2013] prison  is  prison 2411
individual, did not receive counsel.103  Because of Lassiter, many scholars
believed that the Court would find a right to counsel in a case like Turner.104
As will be discussed in Part III, however, the Court did not.  In Part II, this
Article examines why.
II. NARRATIVE DISPARITY AND THE DOCTRINE-ORIENTED APPROACH
The Court has used vastly different narratives in its decisions con-
fronting whether indigent individuals facing time in prison require assistance
of counsel.  These narratives depend on whether the context is civil or crimi-
nal.  This Part examines those language differences outside of the context of
simply categorizing them as criminal, and thus Sixth Amendment cases, ver-
sus civil, and thus Fourteenth Amendment cases.  Doing so reveals that the
Court engages facial doctrinal distinctions instead of focusing on the fairness
that is required no matter the Constitutional Amendment that applies.105  In
the civil context, the Court uses this “doctrine-oriented” approach, and this
Part further examines why the Court adheres to its civil justice system narra-
tive even when the consequence of the proceeding is prison.
A. Criminal Cases: Legitimacy and Protection
The Court uses strong language to describe the role and necessity of
lawyers in the criminal justice system.106  This Article argues that the Court is
motivated by a desire to lend legitimacy to the criminal justice system and
103 Id.
104 See, e.g., Bindra & Ben-Cohen, supra note 9, at 14–15; Catz & Firak, supra note 10, at R
455 (“[C]ases such as Lassiter recognize that quasi-criminal litigants suffer loss of ‘liberty’
interests to some extent similar to those of criminal defendants for purposes of assigning
the right to counsel . . . .”).  Seven circuits determined that in civil contempt hearings
involving incarceration, indigent contemnors should receive appointed counsel. See Eliza-
beth G. Patterson, Civil Contempt and the Indigent Child Support Obligor: The Silent Return of
Debtor’s Prison, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95, 138–39 (2008).  Half of the state legisla-
tures passed laws requiring the same. Id.
105 The doctrinal distinctions are no small issue, and the point is not to underestimate
them.  It is true that in Betts the Court was deciding whether to incorporate the Sixth
Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment and apply the foundational right to
counsel for indigent defendants in federal cases to cases brought in state courts.  See Betts
v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 458 (1942).  The Sixth Amendment speaks clearly about the right to
the assistance of counsel in criminal trials. See supra note 13. But see Turner, 131 S. Ct. at R
2521 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[A]s originally understood, the Sixth Amendment guaran-
teed only the ‘right to employ counsel, or to use volunteered services of counsel’; it did not
require the court to appoint counsel in any circumstance.”).  In the civil context, the Four-
teenth Amendment is the only constitutional provision that applies, and it does not explic-
itly state that there is a right to counsel.  However, the argument this Article makes does
not turn on the language of the two amendments.  To the contrary, this Article argues for a
better reading of fundamental fairness through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment—a reading that will take heed of how the consequence of state power (in this
case prison) should be equally protected against in both the criminal and civil context.
106 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341–42 (1963).
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thus takes a fairly paternalistic view of how the state should protect indigent
criminal defendants.
The Court’s discussion of the right to counsel in the criminal context
falls into three general categories.  First, the Court is at pains to acknowledge
that the state expends significant time and resources in facilitating the crimi-
nal justice system.107  In order to achieve fairness, the Court argues, the state
must provide the defendant with similar tools such as the right to counsel.108
Second, the Court is concerned with the conviction of innocent people and
with what such convictions will do to the legitimacy of the overall institu-
tion.109  To that end, the Court asserts that lawyers are necessary because
laypeople simply do not have the capacity to defend themselves.110  Finally,
the Court rejects a case-by-case approach in the criminal setting because it
asserts there is a danger of unfairness in all cases.111  The inability to distin-
guish cases based on their complexity leads the Court to conclude that when-
ever a defendant’s liberty is in jeopardy—no matter the length of time at
stake—she should have the assistance of counsel regardless of economic
status.112
Gideon provides an example of the first principle—government
resources poured into convicting and incarcerating criminals require that a
defendant have access to counsel.  The Court reasoned that this was an “obvi-
ous truth.”113  It stated, “Governments, both state and federal, quite properly
spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of
crime.  Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect the
public’s interest in an orderly society.”114  Because the government spends so
much time and money on this criminal system, the Court noted that most
defendants who can afford counsel do so—and many of them hire the best
counsel they can find.115  The fact that lawyers are generally hired by defend-
ants and always required by the prosecution led the Court to conclude that
“lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.”116  The Court
explained that while other countries have decided that the right to counsel is
not fundamental, our country is different because it values such “procedural
and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial
107 Id. at 344 (“Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of
money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime.”).
108 Id. at 344–45.
109 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
110 Id. (“[A defendant] requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the pro-
ceedings against him.  Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of convic-
tion because he does not know how to establish his innocence.”).
111 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343–45.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 344.
114 Id.
115 Id. (“Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to
hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defenses.”).
116 Id.
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tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law.”117  To that
end, the Court concluded that this “noble ideal cannot be realized if the
poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to
assist him.”118
The second factor—legitimacy through accuracy—is related to the need
for an indigent defendant to have a lawyer in order to level the playing field.
The Court in Powell focused on the inability of laypeople to defend them-
selves in a complex criminal justice system.  The Court explained that
“[e]ven the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill
in the science of law.”119  After all, a layperson is not familiar with the rules of
evidence, how a trial proceeds, or even how to appeal to a jury.120  The Court
noted, “Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a
proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrel-
evant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible.  He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect
one.”121  The Court demonstrated deep concern for how society might view
the criminal justice system if innocent people are erroneously imprisoned
because of their lack of an attorney.  The “guiding hand of counsel” is neces-
sary, according to the Powell Court, because without it “he faces the danger of
conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.”122
Finally, even worse than the intelligent layperson is the specter of the “feeble-
minded” defendant who is at the mercy of the criminal justice system without
an attorney.  The Court explained that if a “deaf and dumb, illiterate, and
feeble-minded” person were tried without counsel and sentenced to death,
such a sentence “carried into execution, would be little short of judicial mur-
der.”123  Such an extreme case would certainly be viewed as a “gross violation
of the guarantee of due process of law.”124  The Court’s language demon-
strates its concern for how the public views the criminal justice system, and
that to improve the system’s legitimacy, indigent defendants should be pro-
vided with counsel.
The Court made a similar point in Argersinger when it discussed the diffi-
culty and prominence of guilty pleas in the criminal justice system.125  The
Court asserted that individual defendants needed counsel to decide whether
to take a guilty plea or not.126  “Counsel is needed so that the accused may
know precisely what he is doing, so that he is fully aware of the prospect of
going to jail or prison, and so that he is treated fairly by the prosecution.”127
117 Id.
118 Id.




123 Id. at 72.
124 Id.
125 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34 (1972).
126 Id.
127 Id.
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Once again, the Court showed concern for whether the defendant was aware
of the consequences of his actions and for whether the proceedings were fair.
The Argersinger Court similarly expressed concern that there might be a ten-
dency to dispose of cases too quickly, and thus reach the wrong result,
because courts would be so overwhelmed with cases.128  The Court explained
that “the volume of misdemeanor cases, far greater in number than felony
prosecutions, may create an obsession for speedy dispositions, regardless of
the fairness of the result.”129
Finally, in Gideon, the Court ultimately rejected a case-by-case approach
to determining the necessity of counsel in the criminal context.130  It over-
turned the approach articulated in Betts largely because it determined that
defining complexity was a futile exercise.131  In his concurring opinion, Jus-
tice Harlan wrote, “In noncapital cases, the ‘special circumstances’ rule has
continued to exist in form while its substance has been substantially and
steadily eroded.”132  He noted that the Court had only found these “special
circumstances” to be lacking on a few occasions and even then by a “sharply
divided” vote.133  At the same time, he explained that courts had found “spe-
cial circumstances” necessitating the appointment of counsel in cases where
the “complexity” at issue was little more than a “routine difficulty.”134  He
concluded that the “Court has come to recognize . . . that the mere existence
of a serious criminal charge constituted in itself special circumstances requir-
ing the services of counsel at trial.”135  In other words, according to Justice
Harlan, the Betts rule was “no longer a reality” because courts were generally
unwilling to declare that defendants would not benefit from the assistance of
counsel.136  Given that reality, Betts vested too much discretion in judges to
make that determination when the better course was to declare a blanket
rule that would lend some consistent legitimacy to all criminal proceedings.
The Argersinger Court made a similar point.137  In that case, the Court
explained that defendants in even “small” or “petty” cases should have the
right to counsel when imprisonment is a consequence because even small
cases can present the complexities that drove the Court to find the right to
counsel in Gideon.138  The Court wrote, “We are by no means convinced that
legal and constitutional questions involved in a case that actually leads to
imprisonment even for a brief period are any less complex than when a per-
128 Id.
129 Id. (footnote omitted).
130 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343–45 (1963).
131 Id.
132 Id. at 350 (Harlan, J., concurring).




137 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 33 (1972).
138 Id.
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son can be sent off for six months or more.”139  By taking the question of
complexity away from the states and requiring counsel every time prison is
possible, the Court exercises paternalistic authority over state courts.
B. Civil Cases: Efficiency and Deference
In contrast to the narrative of legitimacy and protection in criminal
cases, the Court has other concerns in civil cases.  Instead of language about
the fairness of the proceeding and concern for the individual, the Court uses
language about efficiency and deference to states and their judges.140
Like the criminal context, the language used in the civil context falls
into three broad categories.  First, the Court expresses concern for how
much it will cost the states to provide counsel to indigent parties.141  In full
opposition to its approach in the criminal context—one that notes the
amount of money and resources spent on prosecuting criminals142—the
Court does not discuss how much money is spent on civil justice regimes and
instead focuses on how providing counsel for indigent defendants will fur-
ther affect resource-strapped states.143  Second, and related to the first point
regarding cost, the Court views the lawyer’s role in civil proceedings quite
differently.144  Instead of the protector of the layperson who lends greater
legitimacy to the system overall, the lawyer is described as the over-zealous
advocate who will do nothing more than drive up the costs of the proceed-
ings, with little institutional or individual gain.  Finally, the Court embraces
the case-by-case approach that it completely rejects in the criminal con-
text.145  As opposed to focusing on the complexity that civil cases can pre-
sent, the Court argues that flexibility and discretion are necessities in the civil
context.
The first category—concern for the cost of providing legal assistance in
civil cases—is reflected in the doctrinal test used to address this issue, the
Mathews balancing test.146  That test, by its own terms, requires courts to
weigh the value of the individual’s liberty interest against the cost for provid-
ing the procedural safeguard, and then to balance those interests against the
risk of error if the safeguard is not put into place.147  Moreover, when the
Court discusses whether counsel should be appointed, the cost of providing
139 Id. at 33.  The Court used vagrancy as an example. Id. (citing Papachristou v. Jack-
sonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972)).
140 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 319 (1975).
141 See infra notes 146–49 and accompanying text.
142 See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text.
143 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (laying out the factors the Court considers for due process
and noting that the final one is “the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute proce-
dural requirement would entail”).
144 See infra notes 152–53 and accompanying text.
145 See infra notes 154–63 and accompanying text.
146 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35.
147 Id.
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such attorneys is often presumed to be prohibitive.  In Scarpelli, the Court
wrote that “the financial cost to the State—for appointed counsel, counsel
for the State, a longer record, and the possibility of judicial review—will not
be insubstantial.”148  When making this type of claim, the Court does not
quantify the cost, nor does it rely on a source that might provide such gui-
dance.149  Its assertion is entirely unsupported.
In addition, even when the cost of providing attorneys is quantifiable, it
does not mean the procedural safeguard will be required.  For example, in
Lassiter, the Court admitted the cost of providing attorneys to indigent par-
ents in parental rights termination hearings was quite low when compared
with a parent’s interest in her child, but still found that the right to counsel
was not constitutionally required.150  The Court noted that because the State
“wishes the termination decision to be made as economically as possible,” it
would like to avoid the “expense of appointed counsel.”151  Thus, even when
the expense of providing counsel to indigent individuals was presumed low,
it was still ultimately viewed as a negative.
Similarly, the second factor—the utility of providing attorneys—is dis-
cussed in a discouraging tone.  Instead of guiding the layperson through a
complex legal proceeding, the attorney is described as adding time, complex-
ity, and needless process to the legal action.  For example, in Scarpelli, the
Court wrote,
The introduction of counsel into a revocation proceeding will alter signifi-
cantly the nature of the proceeding.  If counsel is provided for the proba-
tioner or parolee, the State in turn will normally provide its own counsel;
lawyers, by training and disposition, are advocates and bound by professional
duty to present all available evidence and arguments in support of their cli-
ents’ positions and to contest with vigor all adverse evidence and views.152
In other words, adding a lawyer to the indigent individual’s proceeding
would have a cascade effect.  The lawyer will force the state to increase its
legal presence, and leave no stone unturned in his zealous quest to defend
his client.  This advocacy is not viewed as a systemic gain in the civil context.
Quite the contrary, it is a negative, taking time and money away from an
otherwise efficient and fair-enough system.  The same point was made by the
Lassiter Court, when it noted that the state would want to avoid the “cost of
the lengthened proceedings” caused by the presence of an indigent’s
lawyer.153
148 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788 (1972).
149 See Laura K. Abel, Turner v. Rogers and the Right to Meaningful Access to the Courts, 90
DENV. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (discussing the Court’s reliance on intuition and not
empirics in the context of civil right to counsel cases).
150 Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28, 33 (1981) (noting the “concession in
the respondent’s brief that the ‘potential costs of appointed counsel in termination pro-
ceedings . . . is [sic] admittedly de minimis compared to the costs in all criminal actions”).
151 Id. at 28.
152 Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 787.
153 See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 28.
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The Court’s focus on the potential costs to the state and how attorneys
not only add to that cost, but do not add much in the way of value, leads to
the final category of language—the need for a case-by-case approach in
assessing the necessity of appointed counsel.  The Court rejects the applica-
tion of an “inflexible constitutional rule with respect to the requirement of
counsel” and opts for “the exercise of . . . sound discretion” by the individual
in charge of the proceeding.154  The Scarpelli Court explicitly refused the
rationale for Gideon’s adoption of a blanket rule in the criminal context.155
Its reasoning is important because the Court continues to rely on particular
attributes of a civil proceeding to justify the denial of counsel.  For example,
in Scarpelli, the Court distinguished criminal trials from the probation revoca-
tion hearing at issue in that case.156  While a criminal proceeding has a for-
mal prosecutor, applies the rules of evidence, and includes a number of
procedural protections for the defendant that might otherwise be waived,
something like a revocation hearing is much more informal.157  The state is
represented by a parole officer, not a prosecutor, the procedures and rules
are not formalized, and the hearing body in the case of probation is knowl-
edgeable about the general issues in revocation hearings and about the spe-
cific case before it.158  According to the Scarpelli Court, it was in the interest
of “both society and the probationer” to preserve these distinctions between
the criminal and civil proceedings.159  Preservation of such distinctions
requires decision-making bodies to have full discretion to decide on an ad
hoc basis whether counsel is required in any particular case.  The Court
noted that while counsel would be unnecessary in most probation revocation
cases, where fundamental fairness was implicated, the decision-makers could
and should be trusted to provide counsel.160
The Court reached a similar decision in Lassiter.  There, the Court
looked critically at the record before it and determined that even if counsel
had been appointed to Lassiter, her parental rights would still have been
terminated.161  The Court found parental termination hearings were subject
to “infinite variation” as to the facts presented.162  That variation prevented
the Court from coming up with a hard-and-fast set of rules to apply.163  The
flexibility of a case-by-case approach would allow for each decision-maker to
weigh the variations before it and decide whether counsel for the indigent
individual was required or not.  Through this move, the Court demonstrates
a high level of deference to decision-makers in the civil context.
154 Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 790.




159 Id. at 788–89.
160 Id. at 790.
161 Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 32–33 (1981).
162 Id. at 32 (quoting Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 790).
163 Id.
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C. Civil and Criminal Narratives Compared
The Court undeniably uses different narratives to describe the utility of
attorneys in the criminal context versus the civil one.  In the criminal con-
text, there is an awareness of the state’s power and its potential to co-opt
fairness from individual citizens.  This sentiment manifests in the Court’s will-
ingness to admit the full power of the prosecutorial office and criminal jus-
tice system, and further in its willingness to try to offset (if not equalize) that
power by providing indigent defendants with attorneys.  In contrast, in the
civil context, the Court does not acknowledge the presence and power of the
state in particular civil proceedings.  In fact, it downplays the state and
instead focuses on the costs to the state of providing attorneys.
The Court is able to engage in what is arguably an inconsistent response
to similar law-driven proceedings because of how it chooses to describe the
lawyer’s role and its choice of a blanket rule in one setting and a case-by-case
rule in the other.  By creating a narrative of the lawyer as helper to layperson,
the Court justifies the presence of attorneys in the criminal justice system.  In
the majority opinions, there is hardly a mention of the real “cost” to the states
for providing such lawyers, and when there is, the discussion is rather dismis-
sive.164  However, the discussion of lawyers in the civil setting centers on what
they take away from the process—lengthening the proceedings, over-zeal-
ously defending their client, and otherwise adding process without value.165
These are two radically different narratives of the lawyer that cannot be
chalked up to a distinction between civil and criminal practice.  Certainly, it
could be argued that giving criminal defendants counsel protracts the pro-
cess of prosecuting and trying them.  Yet, the Court does not engage that line
of reasoning in its seminal opinions.  Instead, it relies on the argument that a
legitimate criminal justice system necessitates the presence of lawyers on both
sides.  By the same token, one could easily argue that individuals in the civil
justice setting would benefit from the presence of a lawyer.  Yet, the Court
does not engage that line of thinking either and instead relies on the
counter-principle that attorneys add costs and slow the process down.
The Court can maintain this distinction by engaging in a case-by-case
analysis in the civil setting and by completely rejecting any such analysis in
the criminal one.  There is no doubt that the Court could pick a criminal
case, look at the specific facts of that case, and conclude that even if a lawyer
was present, the result would still be guilt.166  Yet, in Gideon, the Court
eschewed that approach.  It did so to demonstrate that the criminal justice
system’s legitimacy was dependent on the appearance of parity between the
state and the accused.  As demonstrated in cases like Scarpelli and Lassiter,
164 See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 n.7 (“We do not share Mr. Justice Pow-
ell’s doubt that the Nation’s legal resources are insufficient to implement the rule we
announce today.”); see also infra Part V.A for a discussion of the cost of providing attorneys.
165 See supra Part II.B.
166 The Court, for example, routinely engages in this type of analysis in the habeas
context.
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however, the Court embraces the case-by-case approach in the civil context
and uses that approach to essentially legitimize the civil justice system.  By
looking at those cases and arguing that an attorney could not have made a
difference,167 the Court attempts to demonstrate that lawyers—in these par-
ticular contexts—would not have helped and would have, in fact, harmed the
overall civil justice system.  The Court achieves the efficiency aims it desires
and further proves its premise that the cost of providing lawyers would be
prohibitive and not effective for the overall regime.
The Court’s reason for using this distinctive language is that there are
doctrinal distinctions to respect—criminal cases get one set of rules and civil
another.  Yet, the Court does not always adhere to these strict doctrinal dis-
tinctions in the criminal setting.168  Its move from Betts to Gideon demon-
strates that it is willing to consider the consequences when formulating
doctrine in the criminal context.  The inevitable question is why the Court
has embraced consequences in the criminal realm, but has so steadfastly dis-
regarded consequences in the civil one.
D. A Doctrine-Oriented Approach
This Article argues that the Court discounts consequences in civil pro-
ceedings because it takes a doctrine-oriented approach.  The challenge is
that the Court is not explicit about the reasoning behind its hard line.  In
other words, except for a doctrinally accurate assertion that a case arises in a
civil proceeding versus a criminal one, it does not expand on its reasoning
for finding a right to counsel in one case but not in the other.169  Yet, the
Court’s use of particular narratives provides clues as to why the Court takes
such a different approach on the issue of right to counsel when the ultimate
consequence to be suffered by the party—prison—is the same.
The Court’s approach to traditional private civil litigation provides the
most important clue.  The Court is often criticized for taking a dim view of
private civil litigation, its plaintiffs, and its lawyers.170  This narrative of hostil-
167 Or, in the case of Scarpelli, remanding that decision to the trial court.  Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1972).
168 For example, in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), the Court applied the
Sixth Amendment to a civil collateral consequence in the petitioner’s ineffective assistance
of counsel claim. Id. at 1482.  In other words, the Court minimized doctrinal distinctions
in the criminal context and expanded a criminal protection to envelope a civil
consequence.
169 Again, this discussion goes beyond the basic distinctions between the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments. See supra note 105. R
170 See, e.g., Brooke D. Coleman, Recovering Access: Rethinking the Structure of Federal Civil
Rulemaking, 39 N. MEX. L. REV. 261 (2009) [hereinafter Recovering Access] (arguing that the
structure of the federal rulemaking bodies benefits better-resourced parties in litigation
and marginalizes less-resourced parties and their lawyers); Brooke D. Coleman, The Vanish-
ing Plaintiff, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 501, 543–50 (2012) [hereinafter The Vanishing Plaintiff]
(arguing that restrictive procedures impact marginalized individuals most profoundly);
Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal
and State Courts, 1 EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004) (studying how trial rates have
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ity toward civil litigation has led the Court to make decisions that often seem
to sacrifice what is just for what is most expedient.171  The difference here, of
course, is that the civil litigation at issue is not private litigation seeking mon-
etary relief for past harms.  Instead, this civil litigation is seeking to enforce
standing court orders with the threat of incarceration.  Yet, even with this
stark distinction—damages versus prison—the Court is unable to divorce
itself from its standard civil litigation narrative.  It simply cannot, or will not,
see that the consequence in these cases, and the party’s circumstances, are
completely different and thus deserving of different treatment.
The Court’s civil litigation narrative is largely driven by its desire to pur-
sue efficiency in the civil context, often at the expense of what is just and thus
declined under various procedural rule changes and shifts in the courts); Marc Galanter,
Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV.
95 (1974) (studying how repeat players in litigation do better in civil litigation than one-
time litigants); Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring Economic and Democratic Theories of Civil Litiga-
tion: Differences Between Individual and Organizational Litigants in the Disposition of Federal Civil
Cases, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1275, 1281 (2005) (finding that organizational parties fared better
than individuals in federal civil litigation); Deseriee A. Kennedy, Processing Civil Rights Sum-
mary Judgment and Consumer Discrimination Claims, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 989, 990 (2004)
(“[T]he prevailing procedural standards undermine the ability of plaintiffs to pursue con-
sumer discrimination claims.”); Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Liti-
gation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982 (2003) (arguing that the Court has sacrificed just
results for its pursuit of efficiency in its construction of procedural rules); Elizabeth M.
Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS
L. REV. 705, 766–67 (2007); A. Benjamin Spencer, Essay, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Proce-
dure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353 (2010) (arguing that the Court’s restrictive approach to
constructing federal rules negatively affects social out-groups); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Con-
tracting Access to the Courts: Myth or Reality? Boon or Bane?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 965, 994 (1998)
(bemoaning appellate review that is increasingly “less searching and less thorough”); Erik
K. Yamamoto, Efficiency’s Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts of Minorities, 25 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 341 (1990) (arguing that procedural reforms have restricted access to the
courts).
171 See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Apportioning Due Process: Preserving the Right to Affordable
Justice, 87 DEN. U. L. REV. 437, 448–49 (2010) (arguing that the better-resourced parties get
the due process they can afford, while other parties get the bare minimum); Coleman, The
Vanishing Plaintiff, supra note 170, at 502–04 (arguing that the Court’s concern with effi-
ciency has effectively driven marginalized plaintiffs and their lawyers out of the civil justice
system); Kennedy, supra note 170, at 990 (arguing that summary judgment practice nega-
tively impacts consumer claims by minority parties); Schneider, supra note 170, at 766–67
(arguing that summary judgment practice marginalizes claims made by women); Michael
Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 561–62
(2001) (arguing that the efficiency aims of summary judgment practice and of the substan-
tive structure of the law make employment discrimination cases difficult to win); Stempel,
supra note 170, at 994 (“[B]oth the 1983 Amendment and the 1993 Amendment [to Rule
11] represent increased procedural hurdles and risk for litigants, resulting in a net
shrinkage of access to courts.”); Carl Tobias, Reconsidering Rule 11, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 855
(1992) (arguing the proposed 1993 version of Rule 11 would still needlessly burden plain-
tiffs and their attorneys); Yamamoto, supra note 170, at 345–49 (arguing that in the name
of efficiency, minority interests have been sacrificed).
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most legitimate for the overall system.  This drive is motivated by a number of
factors, including (1) distrust of the civil justice system; (2) adherence to
federalism principles; and (3) lack of concern for or awareness of marginal-
ized individuals.  These factors appear in both traditional civil litigation opin-
ions and in cases where the consequence of civil litigation is the loss of
liberty.  To put it differently, the Court’s predisposition to distrust civil litiga-
tion leads it to use the same language and approach in this sub-set of civil
cases where the consequence is so distinct.  The point is not that the Court
uniformly agrees on each of these reasons when it rejects the right to counsel
in the civil setting.  This Article argues that individual justices use a combina-
tion of these reasons to ultimately coalesce around an approach that denies
an absolute right to counsel in civil proceedings in which an individual’s lib-
erty is at stake.172
1. Systemic Distrust
One consistent narrative in early cases denying a right to counsel in the
criminal regime and the ongoing denial of such rights in the civil context is a
complete distrust of lawyers.  The language the Court uses in both contexts
questions what value lawyers add to a process.  Words like “delay,” “formal-
ism,” and “zealous” have a distinctly negative tone in these cases and demon-
strate that the Court is in the very least wary of what lawyers do for the system.
In the criminal context since Gideon, the Court has depicted lawyers as
shepherds for hapless defendants, helping them through the precarious
criminal justice system stacked against them.173  In opposition to this lan-
guage, the lawyer in the civil context is often viewed as a greedy, over-zealous
manipulator who has a winner-take-all (or perhaps scorched-earth) approach
172 The “new formalism” of some Justices may also play into how the Court decides this
category of cases. See Thomas C. Grey, The New Formalism (Stanford Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 4, 1999), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
200732 (defining and describing the increase in legal formalism).  For example, the
Court’s personnel changed between the Gideon and Lassiter decisions, and the Warren
Court had a different ethos than the Rehnquist Court.
173 See supra Parts II.A, II.C; see also Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012)
(extending ineffective assistance of counsel claims to the counsel’s failure to communicate
pleas to clients during the plea bargaining stage noting that “as a general rule, defense
counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea
on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused”); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.
Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (extending an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to a situation
where an attorney gave bad advice at the plea bargaining stage, stating “[t]he fact that
respondent is guilty does not mean he was not entitled by the Sixth Amendment to effec-
tive assistance or that he suffered no prejudice from his attorney’s deficient performance
during plea bargaining”); Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002) (holding that a
“suspended sentence that may end up in the actual deprivation of a person’s liberty may
not be imposed unless the defendant was accorded the guiding hand of counsel in the
prosecution for the crime charged” (quoting Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40
(1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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to litigation.174  The utility of the lawyer is a strong justification for requiring
lawyers in the criminal context, lending legitimacy to the criminal justice sys-
tem.  Yet, how lawyers are depicted in the civil context is in polar opposition
to that characterization.  The civil lawyer only delays and cannot help but
create additional formality and excess for the process.  As opposed to the
criminal lawyer as the model of legitimacy, the lawyer in the civil context is a
needless distraction.
Beyond its lower regard for lawyers, the Court does not trust the rigor of
the overall system itself.175  Both inside and outside of the right-to-counsel
context, the Court is often quick to insult lawyers and the drive for fees that
ostensibly motivates them.  This distrust of the system is palpable in the
Court’s decisions in various cases.  For example, in cases addressing the
pleading requirements for civil cases, the Court’s rhetoric about lawyers and
“abuse” of the litigation system is used to justify further curtailment of what
pleadings can survive a motion to dismiss.176  Similarly, this language domi-
174 See supra Parts II.B, II.C.  Consider Justice Friendly’s view of lawyers:
To be sure, counsel can often perform useful functions even in welfare cases
or other instances of mass justice; they may bring out facts ignored by or
unknown to the authorities, or help to work out satisfactory compromises.  But
this is only one side of the coin.  Under our adversary system the role of counsel is
not to make sure the truth is ascertained but to advance his client’s cause by any
ethical means.  Within the limits of professional propriety, causing delay and sow-
ing confusion not only are his right but may be his duty.  The appearance of
counsel for the citizen is likely to lead the government to provide one—or at least
to cause the government’s representative to act like one.  The result may be to
turn what might have been a short conference leading to an amicable result into
a protracted controversy. . . .
. . . .
These problems concerning counsel and confrontation inevitably bring up the
question whether we would not do better to abandon the adversary system in
certain areas of mass justice . . . .
. . . . While such an experiment would be a sharp break with our tradition of
adversary process, that tradition, which has come under serious general challenge
from a thoughtful and distinguished judge, was not formulated for a situation in
which many thousands of hearings must be provided each month.
Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1287–90 (1975).  This
quote was cited in Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 325 (1985), to
support the proposition that lawyers would add too much cost to the processing of vet-
eran’s benefits.
175 See supra note 174; see also infra notes 176–78 and accompanying text.
176 See Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).  In Twombly, the Court “retired”
the more lenient “no-set-of-facts” pleading standard from Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41
(1957), citing as one major reason the fear of heightened discovery costs from a ground-
less claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 588–59.  The Court wrote that a plaintiff with a “largely
groundless claim” should not be allowed to “take up the time of a number of other people,
with the right to do so representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement value.” Id. at
558 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court, by implication,
took a negative view of claims brought by many lawyers, viewing them as seizing on an
opportunity to force a lucrative settlement as opposed to seeking justice.  This position was
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nated the discussion regarding summary judgment.177  Yet, the language
expressing distrust of the system is not just limited to the discussion of proce-
dural doctrines; it crosses substantive lines.  For instance, in a recent case
involving the Petition Clause, the majority criticized the attorney’s line of
questioning in a proceeding leading up to the case, even when it had little or
solidified in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).  In Iqbal, the Court also focused on the
cost of litigation, and not the justice being sought. Id. at 685.  It wrote, “Litigation, though
necessary to ensure that officials comply with the law, exacts heavy costs in terms of effi-
ciency and expenditure of valuable time and resources that might otherwise be directed to
the proper execution of the work of the Government.” Id.; see also Lonny S. Hoffman,
Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us About
Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1233 (2008) (noting that Twombly
presents “the discovery abuse problem in one-dimensional terms.  Even though defendants
are equally capable of abusing discovery, and are at least as equally incentivized to do so,
the Court focused only on the problem of discovery abuse by reference to the incidence of
nonmeritorious litigation . . . brought by plaintiffs”); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to
Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 2
(2010) (arguing these cases demonstrate that “there has been too much attention paid to
claims by corporate and other defense interests of expense and possible abuse and too
little on citizen access, a level litigation playing field, and the other values of civil litiga-
tion”); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 452–53 (2008)
(observing that “the Court suggested that ‘checking discovery abuse’ is a goal it sought to
achieve through the pleading rules as well[,]” but arguing that “[t]here is no reason to
suppose that plaintiffs filing complaints with factual allegations that are merely consistent
with rather than suggestive of liability will resort to impositional discovery requests with
greater frequency than plaintiffs who cross the threshold of plausibility”).
177 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (“Summary judgment proce-
dure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral
part of the Federal Rules as a whole . . . .”).  Like the pleading cases, fear of overzealous
attorneys bringing frivolous cases drove the Court to strengthen the summary judgment
procedure.  In Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), the
Court held that something more than the creation of “some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts” was necessary to require a court to proceed to trial. Id. at 586.  In Matsu-
shita, the Court determined that plaintiffs’ claim made no “economic sense” and rejected
their day in court. Id. at 587, 598.  Again, the insinuation being that the plaintiffs and their
attorneys brought frivolous claims that were wasting the system’s time. But see Michael J.
Kaufman, Summary Pre-Judgment: The Supreme Court’s Profound, Pervasive, and Problematic Pre-
sumption About Human Behavior, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 593, 595 (2012) (arguing judges
should not presume rational human behavior when assessing claims on summary judgment
and that doing so in Matsushita was a mistake under both the law and under prevailing
economic theory); Miller, supra note 170, at 1071 (“Overly enthusiastic use of summary
judgment means that trialworthy cases will be terminated pretrial on motion papers, possi-
bly compromising the litigants’ constitutional rights to a day in court and jury trial.”);
Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court’s Shimmering View of Summary Judg-
ment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95 (1988) (criticizing the
court for its summary judgment cases); Suja Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitu-
tional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139 (2007) (arguing that summary judgment is unconstitutional
because “no procedure similar to summary judgment existed at” the ratification of the
Seventh Amendment and that it “violates the core principals . . . of the English common
law”).
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nothing to do with disposition of the merits.178  In other words, even when
the case is not about the attorney’s performance or whether the lawyer’s assis-
tance is required, the Court will take the opportunity to speak to the lawyer’s
conduct and quality.  By doing so, the Court shows its distrust of both lawyers
and the entirety of the civil justice system.179
In light of this wariness, the Court attempts to make the civil justice sys-
tem more efficient.  Legitimacy is not the primary focus in the civil justice
context; much more prominent is the sense that the lawyers must be reined
in so the overall system does not suffer and grind to a halt.  The Court
appears to view its role with regard to the civil justice system as one of keep-
ing lawyers in line, lest they waste society’s money and time.  The lawyers, as
opposed to the protectors in the criminal setting, are part of the problem in
the civil one.  Driven by this distinctive narrative, the Court treats the ques-
tion of whether lawyers are a necessity quite differently.180
2. Federalism
Another narrative common in the criminal pre-Gideon cases and applica-
ble in the civil context is the Court’s overall deference to states and their
respective court systems.  Ultimately, the state is financially responsible for
implementing many of the Court’s requirements, and the cost of providing
counsel to indigent defendants in both civil and criminal proceedings is no
small matter.181  This concern about how the states would pay for such ser-
178 See Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2496–97 (2011) (noting that by
delineating every question she asked, the majority wrote that the attorney was “invit[ing]
the jury to evaluate the council’s decisions in light of an emotional appeal on behalf of
Guarnieri’s ‘little dog Hercules, little white fluffy dog and half Shitsu’”).  The tone of this
case demonstrates the dismissive view the Court often has of lawyers in the civil context.
179 The Court’s rhetoric regarding attorneys is not solely limited to its official opinions.
See, e.g., Ashby Jones, Scalia: ‘We Are Devoting Too Many of Our Best Minds to’ Lawyering, WALL
ST. J. L. BLOG (Oct. 1, 2009, 8:40 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/10/01/scalia-we-
are-devoting-too-many-of-our-best-minds-to-lawyering (quoting Scalia as questioning why
some of the best minds in our country go into the law and noting that in his opinion the
quality of counsel in the United States is generally high).
180 This is not to say that the Court is not critical of criminal lawyers as well.  It most
certainly is, especially in the cases where the right to counsel is the issue. See supra note 173
and accompanying text.  However, the difference is that, in the civil context, the distrust
has no bounds.  It is not reserved for situations where the lawyer’s performance is at issue,
but instead runs through the Court’s treatment of many subjects and many doctrines. See,
e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89 (1977) (holding that a procedural bar applies in
the civil habeas context largely out of concern that lawyers might try to avoid raising an
issue on direct appeal, only to raise it on habeas—a move the Court referred to as
“sandbagging”).
181 For example, in 2008, the State of Maine “spent $12.8 million on constitutionally
required counsel and $45 million on all other judiciary expenses including salaries, facili-
ties, and materials.”  Zachary L. Heiden, Too Low a Price: Waiver and the Right to Counsel, 62
ME. L. REV. 487, 498 (2010).  “Though the Maine Legislature budgeted $12.1 million for
indigent legal services in 2007, the actual expenditures were expected to rise to $13.6 mil-
lion for 2008, an increase of more than 11 percent.” Id.; see also Judy Harrison, Maine Runs
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vices is reflective of a greater sensitivity to the federal government’s authority
over the states.
Again, the Court’s language is telling.  In Betts, the Court reasoned that
creating a binding rule in this context would “impose” upon the states a
“requirement without distinction between criminal charges of different mag-
nitude or in respect of courts of varying jurisdiction.”182  The Court deferred
to the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland who expressed con-
cern about state courts’ ability to apply different procedures to crimes of dif-
ferent degree.183  The Court quoted Chief Judge Bond as saying, “Charges of
small crimes tried before justices of the peace and capital charges tried in the
higher courts would equally require the appointment of counsel.  Presuma-
bly it would be argued that trials in the Traffic Court would require it.”184
The Court’s civil jurisprudence uses similar language.  It is concerned
with how much lawyers will cost; not just the attorney’s hourly rate, but also
how much the effect of the attorney will cost.  The Scarpelli Court’s discussion
of the “financial cost to the State” as including “appointed counsel, counsel
for the State, a longer record, and the possibility of judicial review” is but one
example.185  Beyond the attorney’s fees, the Court is concerned with what
the presence of the attorney does to the state’s overall civil justice system.  To
put it differently, there is essentially a presumption that the addition of law-
yers would cost the state more than it would benefit it.
This is a notable departure from the skepticism with which the Court
looks at states and their courts in the criminal justice context.  In Gideon, the
Court explained the magnitude of the state’s “machinery to try defendants
accused of crime.”186  In response to that reality, the Court required counsel.
Acknowledgement of the state’s power, as well as the amount of resources
expended in certain civil proceedings, is completely lacking in the civil con-
text.  This is not to say that criminal and civil actions are indistinct from the
state’s perspective.  But, there are some notable similarities.  For example, in
Scarpelli, the Court failed to appreciate that the government involvement in
the probation hearings was similar to the government power exerted in pure
Out of Money for Court-Appointed Attorneys, BANGOR DAILY NEWS MAINE, May 27, 2012, http://
bangordailynews.com/2012/05/27/news/state/court-appointed-attorneys-to-go-without-
pay-again-in-june/ (explaining that due to budget short-falls, attorneys representing indi-
gent individuals would not be paid during the month of June 2012).  Funding for civil
cases can be similarly costly. See Alan W. Houseman, Civil Legal Aid in the United States,
CENTER FOR L. & SOC. POL’Y, (Aug. 22, 2007), available at http://www.clasp.org/admin/
site/publications/files/0373.pdf (estimating overall funding at about $1 billion).
182 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942).
183 Id.
184 Id. Cabining the extension of such a right also concerned the Court because it
noted that because the Fourteenth Amendment extends protection to property, requiring
counsel in Betts might logically lead to a requirement of counsel in civil cases involving
property. Id.
185 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788 (1973).
186 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); see also supra Parts I.B, II.A.
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criminal hearings.187  By calling the probation hearings informal and strip-
ping them of as many adversarial trappings as it could—rules of evidence,
counsel on each side, etc.—the Court downplayed the role and power of
government in the hearings.188  Yet, a significant amount of state resources
go into probation hearings.189  In contrast to the response in the criminal
cases, the Court completely defers to the decision-makers’ discretion—they
are trustworthy and able to decide when a lawyer might be necessary for jus-
tice.  Any concern about state power and how that power might affect the
legitimacy of the proceeding is largely ignored.190
3. Lack of Concern for or Awareness of “Other”
The flipside of the Court’s distrust of lawyers and the civil justice system
is the Court’s disregard for particular types of individuals.  Those individuals
are, most concisely, marginalized.  From employment discrimination claims
to claims of product liability and even on to claims challenging arbitration
clauses, the Court is convincingly accused of having less regard for the power-
less.191  Whether the Court’s ill regard is the consequence of active misan-
thropy or just an inability to be cognitive of one’s subconscious biases, the
Court is often viewed as hostile to the claims made by populations that are
considered “other.”  The Court expresses its hostility by questioning the legit-
imacy of the claims.  Ultimately, when particular people bring certain claims,
the civil justice system is far less accommodating either procedurally or
substantively.
187 See Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 789.
188 Id.
189 Daniel F. Piar, A Uniform Code of Procedure for Revoking Probation, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L.
117 (2003) (explaining the quite adversarial nature of probation hearings in most states).
190 This Article is not asserting that states do not ever choose to exceed constitutional
requirements.  For example, in the termination of parental rights setting, at the time of
Lassiter, thirty-three states and the District of Columbia required counsel to be appointed
to indigent parents.  Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 34 (1981).  Since then, the
number of states requiring counsel has increased to forty-three. See Thornburg, supra note
94, at 542.  The same is true for civil contempt.  In twenty-six states, counsel is appointed to
indigent civil contempt defendants by statute or pursuant to the Constitution.  Transcript
of Oral Argument 15, Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011), 2011 WL 1043624, at *15
[hereinafter Oral Argument].  However, this is not all that different from the criminal
context.  When Gideon was decided, only twenty-two states required the appointment of
counsel; yet, the Court still decided to require counsel as a constitutional matter. Gideon,
372 U.S. at 345.  In the civil context, the Court is reticent to push the states to behave in
any particular way, deferring to the policymakers and by extension the people of the states.
In the criminal context, the Court is willing to step in and state clearly what the Constitu-
tion requires, even when there is a split among states regarding the proper procedure.
191 See Kennedy, supra note 170, at 990 (arguing minorities are disadvantaged in con-
sumer discrimination claims); Schneider, supra note 170, at 726 (arguing employment dis-
crimination decisions favor the employer); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Tainted Love: An Increasingly
Odd Arbitral Infatuation in Derogation of Sound and Consistent Jurisprudence, 60 KAN. L. REV.
795 (2012) (arguing the Court’s jurisprudence in arbitration cases consistently favors the
powerful over the powerless).
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This hostility directly bears on the Court’s jurisprudence regarding right
to counsel in the civil context.  There, the Court’s bias against particular
kinds of individuals plays out because the Court denies the right to counsel
to the kinds of people it is already skeptical of in the larger civil arena.  For
example, in any cases involving the prison population—cases like Scarpelli
and Vitek—the individuals are disproportionately poor and often people of
color.192  The same is true in parental termination hearings like the one at
issue in Lassiter.193  These are the same individuals who are similarly
marginalized in their private civil claims.194
This is not to say that the Court embraces accused criminals to any
greater degree.  Many scholars view the overall state of criminal justice juris-
prudence as dismal at best.195  But, at least with respect to the right to coun-
sel, the Court treats those individuals equally.  Regardless of the person’s
race, ethnicity, or class, the Court has reinforced each individual’s right to
counsel in the criminal context.  In contrast, the Court expands its hostility
against private plaintiffs in the civil justice system to similarly situated individ-
uals whose liberty is at stake in civil proceedings.  This is because the Court’s
rejection of particular claimants in civil cases is used to justify its narrative of
maintaining an efficient system.
III. TURNER V. ROGERS
The issue of whether indigent individuals facing incarceration should
have a right to counsel in civil cases was recently presented to the Supreme
Court in Turner v. Rogers.196  The case asked whether an indigent father who
192 Brief for Elizabeth G. Patterson and South Carolina Appleseed Legal Justice Center
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 7, Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (No.
10–10), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/
publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_2010_2011_10_10_PetitionerAmCuEPattersonandtheSCAp-
pleseed.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter Patterson Brief].  Patterson found in a study that
“[a]pproximately 67% of the noncustodial parent-debtors observed during these proceed-
ings were black, 30% were white, and the remaining 3% were of another or unspecified
race.” Id. The study also found that a “large proportion of the parents held in contempt
were indigent.” Id. at 8.  Another study found that between January 2000 and August 2003,
of the 2899 individuals incarcerated in Dane County (Madison, Wisconsin) for failure to
pay child support, 48% were African American while 50% were white.  Brief for Center for
Family Policy and Practice as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 22, Turner v. Rogers,
131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (No. 10–10), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_2010_2011_10_10_Peti-
tionerAmCuCtrforFamilyPolicyandPractice.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter Family Policy
and Practice Brief].  Yet, the overall African American population in the county was only
4%. Id. at 23.
193 See Thornburg, supra note 94, at 539 (noting arguments about racial bias in paren- R
tal termination hearings were ignored by the Court).
194 See generally Coleman, supra note 170.
195 See Abel, supra note 45, 550–54 (examining failures in the criminal justice system to R
argue that the civil justice system can better handle the same challenges); Barton, supra
note 46, at 1259–62 (criticizing the criminal justice system’s use of public defenders). R
196 Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011).
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had failed to make his child support payments in violation of a court order
had a right to counsel in a contempt hearing—a hearing that resulted in his
incarceration.197  In Turner, the Court could have dispensed with its doc-
trine-oriented approach, and found a right to counsel for all indigent indi-
viduals facing prison, but it did not.  This Part will discuss the distinctions
between civil and criminal contempt, the background of civil contempt in
the child support context, the basic facts of Turner’s case, and the Court’s
ultimate decision in Turner.
A. Civil vs. Criminal Contempt
The distinctions between the law on assistance of counsel in the criminal
and civil context are especially pronounced in contempt.  This is because the
line between criminal and civil contempt is often quite fuzzy.198  In simple
terms, courts can use criminal contempt to punish behavior.  It is a punitive
power courts have to make sure that their authority is not flouted.  In other
words, the power is for the benefit of the court.199  In contrast, civil contempt
is remedial, not punitive, and it is for the benefit of the complainant, not the
court.200  This has led to the assertion that a civil contemnor holds the “keys
to their own prison door.”201  Because the court is only compelling the con-
temnor to do something that is arguably within his power, civil contempt is
not viewed as punishment.  After all, one just complies with the court’s order,
and the contempt is over.
This key distinction between the two modes of contempt has led to each
developing different procedures and consequences.  Most of the rights asso-
ciated with a criminal prosecution apply to criminal contempt.202  This
includes the right to an attorney and the right to an immediate appeal.203
This is not true for civil contempt.  The Court has refused to expand the
rights that attach to criminal proceedings into civil contempt.204  As this Arti-
cle discusses, there is no right to an attorney.  But, there is also no right to an
immediate appeal, no right to a jury, and no right to anything beyond a sum-
mary hearing.205
197 Id. at 2512.
198 Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911) (“Contempts are
neither wholly civil nor altogether criminal.”).
199 RONALD L. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 56 (1963).
200 Id.; see also Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441 (“It is not the fact of punishment but rather its
character and purpose that often serve to distinguish between the two classes of cases.  If it
is for civil contempt the punishment is remedial, and for the benefit of the complainant.
But if it is for criminal contempt the sentence is punitive, to vindicate the authority of the
court.”).
201 GOLDFARB, supra note 199, at 59.
202 Jessica Kornberg, Rethinking Civil Contempt Incarceration, 44 CRIM. LAW BULLETIN 70,
76 (2008) (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 18).
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id. One possible solution would be to argue that civil contempt should be re-
labeled as criminal contempt. See Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Getting Beyond the Civil/Criminal Dis-
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One might be assuaged that the procedural differences are justified
because, in the civil context, the contemnor is not punished.  Yet, in addition
to monetary sanctions, courts often imprison contemnors until they comply
with the court order.  As explained in the next Section, civil contempt orders
in the child support payment context are a good example of how civil con-
tempt can work.  If the parent-debtor misses a payment, he is held in con-
tempt and imprisoned.  If the parent-debtor pays the outstanding debt, he is
freed, but if he does not, he remains in prison.206
B. State Involvement in Enforcement of Child Support Orders
In order to understand the issues involved in Turner, it is important to
know how the state becomes involved in child support payment collection.
What follows is a brief summary of that system.207
tinction: A New Approach to the Regulation of Indirect Contempts, 79 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1073–74
(1993) (arguing courts should use Mathews due process analysis when assessing whether
any criminal procedural safeguards apply in the civil contempt context); Kornberg, supra
note 202, at 82 (arguing for “subject-sensitive treatment” of civil contempt, meaning that
the court should look at the purpose of the contempt to decide whether criminal rights
such as right to counsel should apply).  Yet, there are reasons for maintaining a distinction
between the two.  Primarily, courts need flexibility to do run-of-the-mill contempt proceed-
ings, especially when the state is not arguably in an adversarial position vis-à-vis the contem-
nor. See Int’l Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 833–34 (1994)
(“Contempts such as failure to comply with document discovery, for example, while occur-
ring outside the court’s presence, impede the court’s ability to adjudicate the proceedings
before it and thus touch upon the core justification for the contempt power.”).  One study
determined that the “average contemnor spends less than two weeks in jail before comply-
ing.”  Kornberg, supra note 202, at 72 & n.5.  This means that in many cases, the conse-
quence is less severe and perhaps attributable to the traditional use of civil contempt
incarceration—one intended to get a witness to testify or to get an attorney to produce a
court-ordered document.  Moreover, these “traditional” situations are ones where the con-
temnor is likely to have counsel.  Finally, the valid academic argument for merging the two
made by scholars like Dudley has been rejected by the Court.  There is some appeal to
Dudley’s argument, and it would apply to all criminal procedural safeguards.  Dudley,
supra, at 1073–74.  For right to counsel, he argued that due process “should require the
appointment of counsel for indigent accused contemnors, at least in all cases where the
sanction reaches a certain level of severity.” Id. at 1085.  He noted that “several federal
courts of appeals have already so held[,]” yet with Turner, the Supreme Court effectively
rejected the approach taken by those courts and argued for by Dudley.  Id. Finally, Dud-
ley’s argument for legislative reform also looks to be doomed, as Congress has done little
with respect to civil contempt procedures. Id. at 1096–97.
206 In lieu of holding the parent-debtor in civil contempt under the regime explained
in Part III.B, the state could instead refer his case to a prosecutor, making it a criminal
contempt with the key factual question being whether he could pay or not.  The factual
question would be the same in both cases, but in criminal contempt, he would have
appointed counsel while in civil contempt he would not.
207 For a detailed explanation of the history of child support and the federal govern-
ment’s involvement in its collection, see Daniel Hatcher, Child Support Harming Children:
Subordinating the Best Interests of Children to the Fiscal Interests of the State, 42 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1029 (2007).
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States are critical players in the collection of child support payments not
just because of their social welfare concerns regarding their citizens.  Their
primary motivation was and continues to be receiving federal funding for
their social welfare programs.  Under both Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (“TANF”) and its precursor, Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren, Congress requires states receiving federal funds to set up a system for
child support enforcement.208
More specifically, under Title IV-D, adopted by Congress in 1975, Con-
gress required states to adopt a plan for collection of child support and to
have that plan approved by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.209
Each state, through its plan, is required to set up a system to track down non-
custodial parents, establish paternity, and collect child support where the
children are receiving TANF benefits.210  Benefit recipients are required to
participate in these enforcement efforts and must assign the rights to any
funds that might be collected to the state or federal government.211  Col-
lected funds are generally used to reimburse the state or the federal govern-
ment for the assistance it had already provided to that family under TANF.212
Moreover, once the state is assigned the right to the funds, it is empowered to
use all applicable state processes to collect those funds, including wage gar-
nishment, state income tax intercepts, expedited processes for obtaining and
expediting support orders, criminal prosecution, and contempt.213
208 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996); Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, c. 809,
§ 321(b), Pub. L. No. 81-734, 64 Stat. 550 (1951).  Various legislative acts required states to
establish “organizational unit[s]” that would establish paternity and collect child support
by “entering into cooperative arrangements with appropriate courts and law enforcement
officials.”  Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 201(a)(1), 81 Stat.
877, 879 (1968).
209 42 U.S.C. § 651 (1976); 1975 Act § 101(c)(5)(C), 88 Stat. 2360.
210 42 USC § 654(4).  For the purpose of this section, the Article will refer to all bene-
fits as TANF benefits, even though much of the legislation creating the requirements arose
under the AFDC system.
211 42 USC §§ 602(a)(26), 657(b).
212 42 U.S.C. § 657(b).  These reimbursements costs can really add up.  A noncustodial
parent may find that his order of payment includes Medicaid childbirth costs, the costs of
the aid already provided to the family, and/or the fees associated with a paternity test. See
Family Policy and Practice Brief, supra note 192, at 13.  In 2005, Congress adopted the
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, which gives states additional options for providing more of
the child support payments recovered to the children, as opposed to the state itself.  Pub.
L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006).  However, this part of the legislation had an effective
date of 2008, so it is not yet clear how many states have responded to this legislation.
213 42 U.S.C. §§ 656(a)(1), 666(a)(1)–(8), (b) (2006).  There was a great incentive for
states to invest in mechanisms to implement these collection efforts.  While the federal
government was set to reimburse up to sixty-six percent of the expenditures necessary to
effect this legislation, it also offered to match up to ninety percent of any optional state
expenditures for automating its monitoring and record-keeping systems.  42 U.S.C.
§ 654(16) (2006).  The system can also be used by individuals who are not receiving entitle-
ment payments.  When collecting non-welfare payments, the system is becoming more
effective, increasing from $17.2 billion in 2002 to $21.8 billion in 2006.  Hatcher, supra
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However, Congress has never authorized funding for the incarceration
of delinquent individuals, nor has it provided funding for counsel for indi-
gent defendants who are subject to hearings in order to enforce the support
payments.214  That cost, if any, falls completely to the state.  Thus, the incen-
tive for a state to enforce the payment of child support for its citizens receiv-
ing aid is quite high.  Yet, its incentive for providing counsel within the
context of an enforcement proceeding is lower.215
In South Carolina, pursuant to all of these federal laws and regulations,
the state adopted Family Court Rule 24.  Because it receives federal funding
for its administration of the TANF program, the state tracks the child support
payments made by non-custodial parents of TANF children.216  Under Rule
24, the clerk of the court has the authority to track these accounts, and if she
sees an account in arrears, she issues a rule to show cause.217  The rule to
show cause sets a hearing date before a judge and directs the parent-debtor
to appear at that hearing.218  If the parent-debtor pays, the hearing is can-
celled.  However, if the parent-debtor does not pay, a hearing is held to
determine why and what to do next.219
Under state law, the court has the authority to hold the parent-debtor in
contempt for what it considers to be a willful violation of the child support
order.220  The rule to show cause is considered prima facie evidence that the
debtor-parent has failed to pay child support in accordance with the terms of
the court’s order.221  In other words, it is evidence of the parent-debtor’s
willful failure to pay.  Thus, in these hearings, the debtor-parent has the bur-
note 207, at 1066.  The collection amounts for welfare-payments decreased from $2.9 bil-
lion to $2.1 billion. Id. This difference has led one commentator to note:
While not the initial aim of the IV-D program, the impressive increase in child
support collections for CSE non-TANF families provides a significant benefit to
the families and to society.  But the other side of child support enforcement—
that which continues in the realm of welfare cost recovery efforts—is a different
story.
Id.
214 See, e.g., S. REP. 98-387 (1984).
215 This does not mean that states do not provide counsel to indigent defendants in the
contempt context, however.  Before Turner, at least fifteen states required counsel as a
constitutional matter and an additional eleven states required counsel through statutes or
other regulation.  Oral Argument, supra note 190, at 38–39.  Seventeen of the remaining
states have affirmatively rejected a right to counsel, and the remaining seven are not clear.
Id. at 39.
216 See supra notes 210–12 and accompanying text.
217 Patterson Brief, supra note 192, at 13 (citing South Carolina Family Court Rule 24).
218 Id.  The “rule to show cause” under Rule 24 is considered to have the same force
and effect as a judge’s order issued directly from the court.
219 If the debtor-parent does not show up, the court may issue a warrant for his arrest.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-17-390 (2010).
220 Patterson Brief, supra note 192, at 14 (citing Spartanburg Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.
v. Padgett, 370 S.E.2d 872, 874 (S.C. 1988)).
221 Id. at 14.
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den of establishing the failure to pay was not willful.222  This is a highly fac-
tual determination, and the parent-debtor is expected to explain in writing
and/or bring evidence of his inability to pay.  The parent-debtor must con-
vince the court that he is unable to pay and that the inability to pay is invol-
untary.223  This can be shown through evidence of dismissal from a previous
job, evidence of efforts to find additional employments, statistics of unem-
ployment rates in the area, and evidence of barriers to employment such as
lack of education, mental illness, or physical injury.224
C. Turner’s Failure to Pay Child Support Results in Prison
Michael Turner and Rebecca Price gave birth to a baby, referred to as
B.L.P., a minor child, sometime in 1996.225  The state of their relationship
after the birth of their child is unclear, but it does not appear that they were
together for long because Turner married another woman, Jennie Turner, in
1999.226  Sometime in 2003, Rebecca Price sought financial assistance from
the South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS) through the federal
TANF program.227  As part of the program, Price was required to aid the
state in determining the paternity of her child, B.L.P.228  She did so, and the
state determined Turner was B.L.P.’s biological father.229  Following that
determination, the Oconee County Family Court entered an “Order of
Financial Responsibility,” which required Turner to pay child support pay-
ments to Price in the amount of $51.73 per week.230
From 2003 to 2005, Turner periodically paid his child support obliga-
tions, but he did have some interactions with DSS and family court.231  Dur-
ing that two-year period, he received four rules to show cause.232  He
appeared at those hearings and was sometimes held in civil contempt and
jailed for brief periods of time.233  The judge also ordered his wages gar-
nished, and in some cases, the payments were made on Turner’s behalf by
someone else.234
222 Id.
223 Id. at 16–17.
224 Id. at 17.
225 Brief for Petitioner at 8, Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (No. 10-10), 2011
WL 49898, at *8 [hereinafter Petitioner’s Brief].
226 Id. at 9.  He went on to father three more children with Jennie. Id.
227 Id. at 8.
228 See Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 225, at 8; supra Part III.B.
229 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 225, at 8.
230 Id. This amount was made based on the court’s determination that Turner’s
income was $1386 per month. Id.  While Turner asserted that he was unemployed, the
court determined his “imputed” income pursuant to a DSS standardized formula. Id. at 8
n.5.
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During this period, in 2004, Rebecca Price terminated her public-assis-
tance payments.235  So although any payments Turner made were forwarded
to DSS in the beginning, after 2004, they were forwarded directly to Rebecca
Price.236  This did not mean, however, that the state stopped enforcing the
order.  Quite the contrary, the case continued to be handled as a “Title IV-D”
case.237  This meant that DSS continued to automatically monitor Turner’s
payments, and it continued to issue rules to show cause whenever Turner was
in arrears.
In 2005, the state did just that.  Turner did not appear for a prior hear-
ing, so when he showed up for a later hearing in September 2005, the judge
held him in contempt and sentenced him to six months in prison.238  Turner
was unable to pay the support obligations and served the entire six month
sentence.239  When he was released in January 2006, he owed more than
$1900.240  Two months later, another rule to show cause was issued against
Turner, and the court determined his wages should be withheld.241  When
he continued to miss payments, the court issued a bench warrant for his
arrest.242  He was arrested in December 2007.  By that time, Turner owed
almost $6000.243  At the January 2008 hearing regarding this amount, Turner
was once again unrepresented.  The judge asked him if he had anything to
say, and he responded with the following,
Well, when I first got out [of jail in 2006], I got back on dope.  I done meth,
smoked pot and everything else, and I paid a little bit here and there.  And,
when I finally did get to working, I broke my back, back in September
[2007].  I filed for disability and [Social Security].  And, I didn’t get straight-
ened out off the dope until I broke my back and laid up for two months.
And, now I’m off the dope and everything.  I just hope that you give me a
chance.  I don’t know what else to say.  I mean, I know I done wrong, and I
should have been paying and helping her, and I’m sorry.  I mean, dope had
a hold [on] me.244
The judge did not make any findings of fact, and did not respond to
Turner’s statement at all.  He sentenced Turner to twelve months in prison,
235 Id. at 9 n.6.
236 Id.  In 2009, B.L.P. was placed in Rebecca Price’s mother’s custody (Judy Price). Id.
In 2010, Judy Price passed away, and B.L.P. was placed in Judy’s husband’s custody (Larry
E. Price, Sr.).  Id. Rebecca Price no longer has custody of her child, and like Turner, she
now has child support obligations that she must pay in the name of B.L.P. Id.
237 Id.
238 Id. at 10.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id. Some of the amount owed had diminished because DSS recovered money from
some his federal and state tax refunds, as well as from other benefits payments he was
receiving. Id.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 11.
244 Id.
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unless Turner paid the full $6000 he owed.245  Turner began serving that
time, but his case was taken up on appeal on the grounds that the failure to
appoint counsel during the civil contempt hearing violated Turner’s due pro-
cess rights.246  Denied relief in the state appellate and supreme courts, Tur-
ner’s case was appealed to the Supreme Court.247  For the appellate process,
Turner obtained pro bono counsel.  At the time of filing his petition before
the Supreme Court, Turner was still in arrears for $13,814.72, and had
another contempt hearing scheduled for May 4, 2011.248
D. Supreme Court Decision in Turner
When Turner’s case reached the Supreme Court, the main issue was
whether the Fourteenth Amendment required the appointment of counsel
to indigent individuals facing imprisonment in civil contempt proceed-
ings.249  The decision in Turner was five-to-four.250  The majority rejected the
argument that whenever an indigent person was faced with the possibility of
incarceration, there should be a presumption of the appointment of legal
counsel.251  It attached a “caveat” to this finding requiring that the State pro-
vide sufficient procedural safeguards to ensure the determination of the par-
ent’s ability to pay is fair.252  In rejecting the right to counsel, the Court
noted Sixth Amendment protections, such as right to counsel, do not apply
to civil contempt proceedings like the one in Turner’s case.253  Moreover,
the Court stated that because the civil contemnor “‘carr[ies] the keys of [his]
prison in [his] own pockets,’” the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause allows for a State to have “fewer procedural protections than in a
criminal case.”254
First, the Court rejected the argument that a potential loss of physical
liberty required counsel.  The Court distinguished Gault and Vitek because
the proceeding in Gault was quasi-criminal and the five justices in Vitek did
not agree that there was a right to counsel in that case.255  Further, the Court
distinguished Lassiter; namely the on-point language in that opinion stating
that “ ‘an indigent’s right to appointed counsel is that such a right has been
recognized to exist only where the litigant may lose his physical liberty if he
245 Id. at 12.
246 Id.
247 Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2514 (2011).
248 Id. at 2515.
249 Id. at 2512.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 2517.
252 Id. at 2512.  The Court also addressed the question of whether Turner’s case was
moot because by the time the case was heard, he had been released. Id. at 2514.  The
Court rejected the argument that the case was moot because Turner’s case was most cer-
tainly capable of repetition, yet because of the short terms of his prison sentences, might
otherwise evade review. Id. at 2514–15.
253 Id. at 2516.
254 Id. (quoting Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 633 (1988)).
255 Id. at 2517; see supra Part I.B (discussing Gault and Vitek).
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loses the litigation.’”256  Looking back at the Lassiter opinion, the Court rea-
soned that this language was meant to point out that the right to counsel had
only been found in the context of a loss of physical liberty.257  It was not
meant as a positive statement of the premise going forward in every situation
where liberty was at stake.258
Next, the Court applied the balancing test established in Mathews.259
While it conceded that a person’s interest in his own personal liberty was “‘at
the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause,’”260 the Court
mainly discussed the risk of erroneous deprivation of the debtor-parent’s
interest with and without additional procedural safeguards.261  The Court
focused on three main points.262  First, the Court explained that in most
cases, the issue was “the defendant’s ability to pay.”263  The Court stated that
this inquiry was often a simple one.264  It reasoned that the question of
whether the defendant could pay was directly related to the question of indi-
gence, and in the criminal context, defendants are required to show indi-
gence on their own before being appointed counsel.265  Thus, according to
the Court, if criminal defendants are asked to make this kind of showing
without counsel, then certainly civil defendants could make the same show-
ing on their own at a contempt hearing.266  Indeed, even during oral argu-
ment, the Court questioned whether demonstrating indigence was such a
difficult task.  Justice Sotomayor asked Turner’s counsel, “What can a lawyer
do when someone comes in and says, I’m not earning any money, I can’t
earn it, blah, blah, blah, end of story?”267  In other words, the Court did not
see any real complexity or difficulty involved in showing that one was indi-
gent and wondered how a lawyer might aid in that inquiry.
The second concern articulated by the Court was about the unrepre-
sented parent on the opposing side of the action to collect support pay-
ments.268  The Court noted that in many of these cases, the state is not in
opposition to the defendant, the unrepresented custodial parent is.269  If the
state provided counsel to the defendant, the Court worried that it might slow
the process down because of the “formality [and] delay” that a lawyer would
256 Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2516 (quoting Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25
(1980)).
257 Id. at 2517–18.
258 Id.
259 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
260 Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2518 (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).
261 Id. at 2518–20.
262 Id.
263 Id. at 2518–19.
264 Id. at 2519.
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 Oral Argument, supra note 190, at *10.
268 Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2519.
269 Id.
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cause.270  It would also make the entire proceeding less fair because with an
unrepresented custodial parent pitted against a represented non-custodial
parent, the court might reach an erroneous decision and deprive a child “of
the support it is entitled to receive.”271
Finally, the Court reasoned that fairness would be served by certain “sub-
stitute procedural safeguards.”272  These safeguards would lower the chance
of wrongfully depriving the defendant of his liberty while also maintaining
fairness in the process with respect to the custodial parent and her inter-
ests.273  Such safeguards included the use of a form to solicit information
about the defendant’s ability to pay, notice to the defendant that this would
be a major issue in his hearing, an ability for the defendant to respond to
arguments about his ability to pay, and “an express finding by the court that
the defendant has the ability to pay.”274  These or similar safeguards, the
Court opined, would “significantly reduce the risk of an erroneous depriva-
tion of liberty” but would not “incur[ ] some of the drawbacks inherent in
recognizing an automatic right to counsel.”275  Because Turner had not
received any of these procedural safeguards, the Court remanded the case
back to the South Carolina Supreme Court.276
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 Id. (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 355 (1976)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
273 Id.
274 Id.  These were all suggestions made by the Solicitor General, who argued during
this case.  The position of the Solicitor General was that Turner did not receive due pro-
cess, but that did not mean counsel was required in every civil contempt hearing.  Oral
Argument, supra note 190, at *25–*26.  To the contrary, the Solicitor General suggested
these substitute procedural safeguards would meet the requirements of due process. Id. at
*26.
275 Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2519.  The Court also limited its opinion to situations where the
opposing custodial parent was not represented by counsel; it did not speak to what its
decision would be if the State were directly bringing the action. Id. at 2520.  It indicated
that it might find a right to counsel in that situation because it “resemble[d] [a] debt-
collection proceeding[ ].” Id. (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462–63 (1938)).  For
more on Zerbst, an early right to counsel decision in the federal courts, see supra note 14. R
The Turner Court also did not address its decision for what it referred to as “an unusually
complex case where a defendant can fairly be represented only by a trained advocate.”
Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2520 (internal quotation marks omitted).
276 Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2520.  Justice Thomas, writing for the dissent, rejected the
majority’s finding that additional procedural safeguards were necessary and also ques-
tioned the right to appointed counsel in the criminal context. Id. at 2520–21 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).  Thomas first noted that the right to counsel in criminal prosecutions has been
read to arise from the Sixth Amendment, which does not apply to civil contempt proceed-
ings because, well, they are civil. Id. at 2521, 2523.  He also questioned the right to counsel
in criminal proceedings, noting that, “as originally understood, the Sixth Amendment
guaranteed only the ‘right to employ counsel, or to use volunteered services of counsel’; it
did not require the court to appoint counsel in any circumstance.” Id. at 2521 (quoting
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1495 (2010)).  Beyond that, Thomas also rejected the
majority’s fashioning of “substitute procedural safeguards” because he did not believe that
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IV. A CONSEQUENCE-DRIVEN APPROACH
In Turner, the Court took a doctrine-oriented approach when it rejected
a civil indigent individual’s right to counsel in proceedings where prison was
the ultimate consequence.  In lieu of a doctrine-oriented approach, this Arti-
cle argues for an approach that is consequence-driven.277  The narratives
underlying the Court’s adoption of a blanket rule regarding right to counsel
in the criminal context apply with equal force in the civil one.  In civil pro-
ceedings like the one in Turner, lawyers are a necessary part of the justice
process.  This is because the same concerns that motivated the Court to find
a right to counsel in the criminal context exist in the civil one.  First, the
power and resources used by the state to pursue the individual in a civil con-
tempt hearing can be immense, and a lawyer is necessary to even marginally
equalize the playing field.  Second, individuals do not have the capacity to
appropriately defend themselves in these actions, and the judge is not capa-
ble of deciding cases while appropriately protecting the individuals’ interests.
Finally, all cases involving this potential for incarceration are complex, so a
blanket rule, and not a case-by-case approach, should be adopted.
Using Turner as an example, this Article shows that if the Court eschews
a doctrine-oriented approach and embraces an approach concerned with the
consequences, it would have found that Turner had a right to an attorney.
Next, this Article offers a doctrinal path for the Court in finding a right to
counsel in a case like Turner.  It can either find the right as a presumptive
matter whenever an individual’s liberty is at stake or it can use Mathews to
find the right in most cases involving incarceration as a consequence.
A. State Power Is Comparable to That in Criminal Proceedings
In a civil contempt hearing, like the one in Turner, the government’s
presence is notable.  Because of federal incentives and requirements, the
state agencies monitor support payments religiously.278  When those pay-
ments are not made, there is a government-run system in place to call the
offending parent before the court.  The Turner Court distinguished Turner’s
case from other contemnor cases where the government agency was attempt-
issue was properly before the Court and, even if it were, the safeguards were not appropri-
ate in this context. Id. at 2424–25.  Thomas pointed out the power differential created
between a custodial mother without counsel seeking her child support payments and the
non-custodial debtor-parent who, in the civil contempt moment, might now receive coun-
sel. Id. at 2525–26.  Finally, he argued that when fathers do not pay child support, the
children suffer, and that because contempt proceedings have resulted in the increased
collection of such payments, it is a valid policy decision for states and government officials
to make. Id. at 2526.
277 This approach does not explicitly rely on consequentialism as a theoretical or juris-
prudential value, but it certainly relies on its underlying logic. See generally L.W. SUMNER,
WELFARE, HAPPINESS, AND ETHICS (1996) (describing and discussing various forms of conse-
quentialist thought).
278 See supra Part III.B.
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ing to recover funds it was directly owed.279  The implication of the Court’s
distinction is that it might view the latter case differently because there, the
power of the state agency and the attendant need for lawyers is more
pronounced.
While it is notable that the Court might be more concerned when the
state is collecting on its debts directly from the parent-debtor, the distinction
made by the Court is a false one.  Without the government mechanisms in
place, many custodial parents would not otherwise follow through in seeking
payments from their non-paying spouses through contempt hearings.  The
system makes it simple for custodial parents to seek the payments and to ask
for the parent-debtor to be held in contempt if such payments are not forth-
coming.  This is not necessarily a bad use of the government’s resources, but
for the Court to act as if there is no state action simply because the custodial
parent is the named complainant, as opposed to the state, ignores the reality
of the situation.  For example, Rule 24 in South Carolina requires the clerk
of the family court to automatically issue a rule to show cause against a par-
ent-debtor whenever the child support account is in arrears.280  A computer
system tracks these accounts and payments, and thus the process of issuing
the show-cause order and requiring the parent’s appearance is completely in
the hands of a government agency.
In addition, a representative of the agency responsible for collecting the
payment is present at the contempt hearing alongside the parent seeking
payment.  That representative has access to all sorts of materials at issue in
the case, while the parent-debtor has no comparable access.  In many cases, a
lawyer for the agency will also attend these hearings.  In a study conducted in
South Carolina, court observers noted that “[i]n all observed hearings, an
attorney for [the Department of Social Services] was present, usually sitting at
opposing counsel’s table.  The DSS attorney often was assisted by a DSS staff
member with computer access to information in the agency’s database.”281
These attorneys are not passive observers, but are instead active participants
in the contempt proceedings.282  Moreover, where a parent-debtor can
afford a lawyer, presumably he would hire one.283  The degree of govern-
ment power is strikingly similar to the Gideon Court’s discussion of
prosecutorial power in criminal actions, as is the Court’s observation that
where criminal defendants can afford lawyers, they hire the best.  This leads
to the argument that lawyers are not luxuries in this context, but
necessities.284
279 Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2520.
280 Patterson Brief, supra note 192, at 13–14.
281 Id. at 14.
282 Id. at 15.  The study also noted that “[e]ven when [the] DSS attorneys did not lead
the questioning, however, these agency lawyers often participated in the proceedings.” Id.
283 While the parent-debtor can be a mother or a father, for ease, this Article will refer
to the parent-debtor as “he” and to the custodial parent as “she.”
284 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“[L]awyers in criminal courts
are necessities, not luxuries.”).
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Another aspect of Turner worth noting is with regard to the custodial
parent in that case.  In both the majority and dissent, the Court was very
concerned about the impact on the unrepresented custodial parent if an
attorney was provided to the indigent parent-debtor.285  This is a legitimate
concern, but one that should be minimized for a couple of reasons.  First, the
custodial parent is often not the direct beneficiary of the contempt process.
In many cases, any money collected is paid directly back to the government
as reimbursement for entitlement payments already received by the custodial
parent.286  Second, even when the parent is the recipient of the funds, if
paid, he or she is not a necessary element of the hearing.  The issue to be
resolved is not whether the payments are owed; they are, and that has already
been determined.  The issue is how to get the parent-debtor to pay.  Whether
the parent-debtor is held in contempt, his wages garnished, or his tax return
intercepted is not decided by the custodial parent.  That parent requests pay-
ment, and the state agency and the judge determine mode of collection.
Thus, there is little reason to represent the custodial parent because his or
her critical interest is the payment, not the manner in which it is obtained.
In Turner, for example, the records reflect that the judge and Turner
exchanged very few words before the contempt order was entered.287  The
judge did not question the custodial parent, and the custodial parent did not
make any kind of statement.  Even in Turner’s later hearings, there is noth-
ing in the record to suggest that the custodial parent was consulted.  Custo-
dial parents do not instigate the hearings in this process; the state does that.
Concerns about the unrepresented custodial parent in a hearing that she did
not request are rather misplaced.288
Finally, the system for collecting support payments disproportionately
impacts poorer individuals.289  Seventy percent of the child support owed
nationwide is owed by parents who have no reported income or who make
less than $10,000 per year.290  A 1997 study determined that of the 4.5 mil-
lion noncustodial fathers who did not pay child support, 2.8 million of them
285 See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2519, 2525–27 (2011).
286 See Hatcher, supra note 207, at 1029 (noting that “half of the $105 billion in
national child support debt is owed to the government”).
287 See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2513–14.
288 See Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Fatherhood: Welfare Reform, Child Support Enforce-
ment, and Fatherless Children, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 325, 373 (2005). (“Being forced into
repeated court appearances with mother as plaintiff (although the state initiated the case)
and father as defendant undermines relationships in these fragile families. . . . The
mother’s name on the case may make it look like she instigated the case, though she actu-
ally has no control in the decision to begin a contempt action and is often not informed
about the action until she, too, receives a summons.”).  Moreover, the Court fails to recog-
nize that even in the criminal justice system, where counsel is appointed to indigent
defendants, the victim’s interest may not be completely protected or in line with the prose-
cution’s interest.
289 See Patterson Brief, supra note 192, at 7; Family Policy and Practice Brief, supra note
192, at 22–23.
290 Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2518.
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were poor.291  Moreover, when the consequence of failure to pay is imprison-
ment, local penal institutions are disproportionately filled with individuals
unwilling or unable to pay child support.  For instance, some studies have
determined that thirteen to sixteen percent of those incarcerated in the
South Carolina county jail are parent-debtors.292  What this means is that, as
a result of the incentive structure created by federal financial assistance pro-
grams, states like South Carolina are pursuing and incarcerating poor fathers
in staggering numbers.  This kind of resource disparity is exactly what led the
Court to adopt a right to counsel in the criminal context.293  As the Gideon
Court explained, fairness “cannot be realized if the poor man . . . has to face
his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.”294
B. Disputed Issues Are Complex
In order to provide fair hearings in this context, lawyers should be
appointed to indigent individuals.  While the Court took a rather dismissive
view of the showing necessary to defeat finding of contempt in this context—
recall Justice Sotomayor’s “blah, blah, blah” retort—what parent-debtors
need to demonstrate is fairly complex.  A number of legal issues can arise in
these hearings—not just the factual question of whether an individual can
pay the support payments or not.295  Questions of law, such as whether the
admission of drug-use constitutes an inability to pay, are an example.296
Factual arguments can also be quite thorny.  The argument, in the spirit
of Justice Sotomayor’s comment, is that the inability to pay is easily shown.  It
is a “straightforward matter of assets, employment, and other sources of
income.  W-2 forms, paycheck stubs, tax returns, and notes from doctors or
employers are simple documents that [parent-debtors] can bring and intro-
duce themselves.”297  Yet, demonstrating inability to pay is really not that sim-
ple.  As one scholar explained,
Even the simplest inability to pay argument requires articulating the
defense, gathering and presenting documentary and other evidence, and
291 Elaine Sorensen & Chava Zibman, Getting to Know Poor Fathers Who Do Not Pay Child
Support, 75 SOC. SERV. REV. 420, 422 (2001).
292 Family Policy and Practice Brief, supra note 192, at 2–3.  The numbers in South R
Carolina are not unique.  Other states, like Indiana, have large parent-debtor prison popu-
lations as well. See Patterson, supra note 104, at 117.  In 2002, 2400–3300 parent-debtors R
were reportedly incarcerated in that state for non-payment, and eighty to eighty-five per-
cent of those were pursuant to civil contempt. Id.
293 See Engler, supra note 9, at 79 (discussing that disparity in power between the R
unrepresented party and the party bringing the action necessitates a law because she can
“neutralize the power that the unrepresented litigant typically encounters, providing a vul-
nerable, one-shot litigant with the benefits of repeat-player status”).
294 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
295 See Oral Argument, supra note 190, at *59–*60 (listing potential legal questions that
could arise at a hearing).
296 Id.
297 Brief of Respondents at 52, Turner v. Rogers, 130 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (No. 10-10),
2011 WL 481836 [hereinafter Respondent’s Brief].
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responding to legally significant question from the bench—tasks which are
probably awesome and perhaps insuperable undertakings to the uninitiated
layperson.298
In other words, it is just as difficult to show an inability to pay as it is to
defend against a misdemeanor.  If lawyers were necessary for even “petty”
crimes, they are certainly necessary for proceedings like those in Turner.  In
fact, an attorney might have been able to help Turner demonstrate that he
could not pay his outstanding support payments.  At his hearing, Turner gave
the family court a copy of his application for disability payments.299  It
showed that he had no income.300  Yet, the court did not take that form into
account.301  Had an attorney been there, she might have been able to direct
the court’s attention to the form and provide further corroborating evidence
necessary to show Turner’s inability to pay.302
Turner’s story also provides an excellent example of how an attorney
might have helped the court and the entire system reach a better result
instead of additional incarceration.  During the pendency of his appeal, Tur-
ner was once again summoned to the South Carolina family court.303  The
pro bono counsel representing him on appeal attended that hearing.  Coun-
sel suggested that the court suspend Turner’s sentence contingent on Turner
completing a substance abuse program.304  The court and DSS agreed to this
proposal.305  On at least the four previous occasions that Turner had
appeared before the family court, he was without counsel and was summarily
sentenced to anywhere from six months to a year in prison.306  Yet, when he
had counsel, the result of the same action was completely different.307
While the impact of an attorney in Turner’s case is anecdotal at best, the
difference in results obtained with an attorney present is notable.  In addi-
tion to these anecdotes, some studies have determined the presence of coun-
sel makes a positive difference for the parent-debtor.308  For example, in one
study looking at 326 obligors randomly selected in South Carolina, only
298 Patterson, supra note 104, at 121 (internal quotation marks omitted). R
299 Reply Brief for Petitioner at 15, Turner v. Rogers, 130 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (No. 10-
10), 2011 WL 805230 [hereinafter Reply Brief].
300 Id.
301 Id.
302 Id. at 16.
303 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 225, at 15 n.10.
304 Id.
305 Id.
306 Id. at 9–12.
307 Unfortunately for Turner, he was not successful in his treatment program and he
was placed in jail again while his case was pending before the Supreme Court. Id. at 15
n.10.  That fact should not affect the argument that attorneys can and do make a differ-
ence in this context.  However, allegations about Turner’s ability to pay are made in
Respondent’s Brief.  The allegation was that Turner was selling prescription drugs illegally.
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 297, at 12.  The brief also alleged that Turner was able to
post a $10,000 surety bond when arrested for selling drugs to an undercover officer. Id.
308 See Patterson Brief, supra note 192, at 10.
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twelve (or 4%) were represented by attorneys.309  The parents without coun-
sel were held in contempt “more than twice as often as [those] who were
represented by counsel.”310  Only two of the twelve (or 17%) of the repre-
sented parents were held in contempt, while 131 of the 314 (or 42%) of the
unrepresented parents were.311  The study noted that there were no appreci-
able differences between the financial situations of the parents represented
by counsel and those that were not.312  The only consistent difference was
whether counsel was present.313
C. Case-by-Case Approach Should Be Rejected
This leads to the determination of complexity and whether courts
should decide if attorneys are necessary on a case-by-case basis.  As already
discussed, the argument that contempt proceedings in this context are sim-
ple is dubious at best.  Because of the inability to accurately assess complexity,
the Court should eschew a case-by-case approach in this context.
Such an approach was initially embraced in the criminal context by the
Betts Court, but later rejected in Gideon.  The Betts Court feared the applica-
tion of “hard and fast rules” because the danger of such rules was that the
“qualifying factors” in any particular case would be ignored.314  The Four-
teenth Amendment would “prohibit[ ] the conviction and incarceration of
one whose trial is offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness
and right,” such that the absence of counsel “in a particular case” might run
afoul of the Amendment.315  The Court was reticent to require counsel in
every criminal case, however, because it was not convinced that the Four-




312 Id. at 12.
313 Id. One response may be that any mistakes made in the contempt hearing can be
corrected on appeal.  But, this argument ignores the impact that lawyers have on creating a
reviewable record.  Without a lawyer present to create the record and raise the issues on
behalf of her client, the record on appeal will appear quite uneventful to an appellate
court.  In other words, “[d]etermining the difference legal representation would have
made becomes possible only through imagination, investigation, and legal research
focused on the particular case.”  Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 51 (1981)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).  Because the appellate court is unable to know what happened
at the lower court, it is truly unable to rigorously review the decisions made.  The danger in
this, of course, is that the legitimacy of the entire system is called into question.  The
chance of erroneous decisions is increased because of the absence of the lawyer.  Relatedly,
the ability to correct such deprivations on appeal is lessened because the lawyer was not
there to raise critical arguments and facts necessary for an effective appellate court review.
See id. (“Such failures, however, often cut to the essence of the fairness of the trial, and a
court’s inability to compensate for them effectively eviscerates the presumption of
innocence.”).
314 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942).
315 Id. at 473.
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any offense, or in any court, can be fairly conducted and justice accorded a
defendant who is not represented by counsel.”316
In Turner, the Court also provided for flexibility, requiring particular
procedural safeguards and allowing courts to otherwise assess the necessity of
counsel on a case-by-case basis.317  Like Betts, the Turner Court opined that
with certain safeguards, the “risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty”
would be “significantly reduce[d].”318  And with a flexible rule, courts could
assess what fundamental fairness required in each particular case and not be
bogged down by lawyers in cases where they were not necessary.319
A case-by-case approach in the criminal justice system was ultimately
rejected because the Court realized the risk of unfairness was too high.  One
major reason is that the decision is left solely in the hands of one judge—a
judge that risks being susceptible to significant bias.  Beyond providing assis-
tance to the individual, an attorney also acts as the judge’s conscience in
these types of hearings.  The judge may be unaware of her bias against an
individual, but when an attorney is there to speak as an advocate for that
person, the judge is less likely to give in to those tendencies.  This is true in
all cases, whether they be deemed simple or complex.320  The risk of a
judge’s bias affecting her ability to decide whether counsel is necessary or
not, and the associated risk the lack of an attorney will allow any such bias to
go unchecked, requires the Court to forego a case-by-case approach in the
civil context.
This concern is acute.  The ability of the judge to honestly see what is
simple or complex from the perspective of the individual before her is highly
questionable.  After all, judges are trained to think in legal terms, and what
might be simple to them is certainly not so simple for laypeople.321  In the
study already discussed, court observers noted that parent-debtors with iden-
tical financial situations were treated differently by the same judge.322  Where
the parent was represented by an attorney, the judge did not hold the parent
in contempt, but where another parent with indistinguishable financial facts
appeared without an attorney, the judge held that particular parent in con-
tempt.323  This further demonstrates that when the attorney is present, the
316 Id.
317 See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2519 (2011).
318 Id.
319 Id.
320 See Engler, supra note 9, at 82 (“The importance of skilled advocates increases rela- R
tive to the power stacked against the unrepresented litigants.”); Margit Livingston, Disobedi-
ence and Contempt, 75 WASH. L. REV. 345, 387 (2000) (criticizing Justice Blackmun’s opinion
in Bagwell and noting that “[t]here seems to be just as much need for unbiased factfinding
in the case of simple decrees as in the case of complicated ones”).
321 See Abel, supra note 149, at 9–10 (“[Judges] have experience in the workings of
their own courtrooms and the caselaw, laws and rules used therein.  And they do not have
a large stake in the cases before them, unlike the litigants, who may have difficulty thinking
clearly in a case involving the potential loss of . . . livelihood.”).
322 Patterson Brief, supra note 192, at 11.
323 Id.
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court is more likely to engage the individual’s argument and less likely to be
dismissive on the basis of her own bias.
In addition, while the risk of bias exists in any court hearing, it is espe-
cially pronounced in the contempt context because the alleged contemnor is
literally accused of flouting the court’s order.324  As Professor Earl Dudley
explained:
There is, however, no reason to believe that the pervasive difficulties
afflicting the contempt process are absent whenever the sanction chosen is
civil in form.  A judge offended by perceived flouting of his authority . . . is
no less likely to resolve factual issues in a biased manner simply because he
chooses ultimately to impose a sanction designed to coerce obedience . . . .
By carefully crafting the sanction [as civil, not criminal], a biased judge can
drastically limit the procedural protections afforded the accused
contemnor . . . .325
Without an attorney, any judicial bias aimed at the parent-debtor will go
unchecked.
Finally, the judge also might not understand the complexity of what the
parent-debtor is experiencing, and thus, might lump all non-paying parent-
debtors into one homogeneous group.326  This results from understandable
frustration.327  After all, the judge often only knows of an obligation and fail-
ure to pay; there is no advocate to explain the nuance in the cases before
her.328  Moreover, in the eyes of society, the father who does not pay for
child support is a stereotypical “deadbeat dad.”329  Like all stereotypes, this
label is dangerously generalized.330  At least thirty-three percent of these
fathers are simply unable to pay because of their lack of income.331  There
324 See Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Contempt Sanctions and the Excessive Fines Clause, 76
N.C. L. REV. 407, 415 (1998) (noting that the Court has acknowledged the propensity for
bias on this basis in the criminal contempt context, but ignored the possibility in the civil
one).
325 Dudley, supra note 205, at 1062–63.  But, in the same article, Dudley doubted
whether judicial bias would affect determinations made in family law “because imposing
severe contempt sanctions is in tension with the ultimate goal of providing alimony and
child support.” Id. at 1076. He also stated that “jail sentences . . . will, in the vast majority
of cases, impede the achievement of [the] objective [of providing child support for the
child] by impairing, if not destroying, the defaulting parent’s or former spouse’s ability to
pay.” Id.  Unfortunately, in Turner’s case, and in countless others, Dudley’s assessment of
how the issue of contempt and child support would be handled by courts—and whether
judicial bias might play a role—was inaccurate.
326 See Patterson, supra note 104, at 124.
327 See id. (“Caught up in the important goal of meeting the economic needs of
America’s children and the norms of parental responsibility, they can become frustrated
with the repeated court appearances of obligors with huge arrearages, a history of nonpay-
ment, and an endless stream of what seem to be excuses for not providing for their
children.”).
328 See id.
329 See Murphy, supra note 288, at 353–54.
330 See id.
331 Id. at 354.
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are also the associated complexities attendant to that level of poverty—lack
of education and employment opportunities, youth, and criminal histo-
ries.332  Even with the most progressive of judges, it is difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to ignore this stereotype when presented with child support cases on a
day-to-day basis.  While such a bias might be explicable, it is certainly not
acceptable.  The addition of a lawyer would ease this bias effect.  Also, taking
away the judge’s ability to decide on a case-by-case basis whether an attorney
is necessary would ensure that her bias stays out of that determination pro-
cess as well.
In sum, critical factors such as power and resource disparities, complex-
ity, and judicial bias caused the Court to reframe its view of how the right to
counsel should be applied in the criminal context.  After all, erroneously
imprisoning indigent individuals would call the legitimacy of the entire crimi-
nal justice system into question.  The Court utilized these factors and its posi-
tive narrative of the lawyer to adopt a presumptive right to counsel.  As it
already has in the criminal justice system, the Court should similarly adopt
this narrative and set aside the narratives it associates with traditional civil
litigation.  The issues—state power, complexity, and bias—are not meaning-
fully different in the civil context.  And the consequence—prison—is identi-
cal.  If the Court sheds the narratives that underlie its civil justice
jurisprudence and views these cases for what they really are, it should deter-
mine counsel is necessary for indigent individuals in every case, civil and
criminal alike.
D. A Doctrinal Path
Using a consequence-driven approach in the civil context should lead
the Court to determine the appointment of counsel for indigent individuals
is absolutely necessary whenever prison is the consequence.  The next ques-
tion is how the Court can get to that result under existing law.  This Article
argues that there are two doctrinal paths.  One is to find that where liberty
interests are at stake, and the power and authority of the state is largely
behind the taking of that interest, the appointment of counsel should be
presumptive.  The second way is to find that under Mathews the appointment
of counsel is required in order to mitigate an otherwise intolerable risk of
error.333
332 Id.
333 Some scholars have proposed finding a right to counsel for indigent defendants
based on an equal protection argument. See, e.g., Bindra & Ben-Cohen, supra note 9, at R
19–31.  Because an equal protection approach has yet to gain any traction with the Court
in this context, this Article will only address the potential due process arguments.  Simi-
larly, at least one scholar has argued that the Privileges or Immunities Clause can be used
to argue for a broader access to courts. See Risa E. Kaufman, Access to the Courts as a Privilege
or Immunity of National Citizenship, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1477 (2008).  This argument has not
been accepted by the Court, so its chance of being expanded to include a right to counsel
as part of the broader access is minimal.  Finally, at least one scholar has argued that a
procedural due process right might be found in respective state constitutions. See Michael
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The first path would literally carry forward the promise of the Court’s
language in Lassiter.  There, the Court spoke of a “presumption that an indi-
gent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may
be deprived of his physical liberty.”334  That is exactly what is at issue in these
cases—a deprivation of physical liberty that is necessitated by court action
empowered by the state.  This seems to be exactly what the Fourteenth
Amendment should cover in the interest of ultimate fairness.  And, prior to
Turner, lower courts had followed this language from Lassiter and other civil
cases to find a right to counsel in such situations.335  The Turner Court made
a misstep by rejecting the express language of Lassiter and relying instead on
a doctrine-oriented approach prioritizing efficiency over legitimacy.  Had the
Court followed Lassiter and a consequence-driven approach, it would have
required counsel in Turner’s case as a presumptive matter.
However, even if the Court were to reject a presumptive rule, it could
still find that in cases like Turner, counsel is required under Mathews.  The
Court has already established that the liberty interest at stake is significant.336
As to the state’s interest in the efficiency of its proceedings, there is little
evidence in the record showing that the cost of providing counsel is prohibi-
tive for the state.  Assuming that it is, however, the interest in incarcerating
parent-debtors is arguably high, as the state has an interest in making sure
child support payments are made.  Thus, the inquiry turns on whether the
risk of an erroneous decision is significant and, if so, whether the procedural
safeguard of an appointed attorney would necessarily lower that risk.
The analysis provided under the consequence-driven approach demon-
strates that the risk of error is exceedingly high.  The state is a powerful insti-
tutional player in the effort to jail the individual, the showing necessary to
avoid contempt is quite complex, and the judge is not aware of her own bias
in the hearing.337  These three factors combine to make the risk of error in
the contempt proceedings far too high.  Furthermore, the appointment of
counsel would go a long way toward countering the problems created by the
contempt process.  The lawyer is there to act as a counter to the impressive
power of the state, guide the parent-debtor through the complexity of the
process, and check the judge’s power.
Moreover, a true cost-benefit analysis under Mathews reveals that the
Turner Court not only underestimated the benefit of adding attorneys to this
process, but also grossly overestimated the cost of providing attorneys
because it failed to recognize the overall cost of the contempt system in the
child support collection context.  First, there is an acute risk of inaccuracy in
Millemann, The State Due Process Justification for a Right to Counsel in Some Civil Cases, 15
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 733 (2006).
334 Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26–27 (1981).
335 See Patterson, supra note 104, at 138–39 (noting that seven circuits have determined R
that in civil contempt hearings involving incarceration, indigent contemnors should
receive appointed counsel).
336 See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2518 (2011).
337 See discussion supra Part IV.A.–C.
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the contempt determinations.  When the indigent individual does not have
an attorney, he is before the judge and against a well-resourced individual or
government entity.  This creates a major disparity in the adversarial process,
putting the judge at a distinct disadvantage.  The judge cannot act as both
neutral arbiter and advocate for the accused, no matter how hard she may
try.  The judge simply does not get all the information needed to make an
informed decision.338  In other words, the risk of error when indigent indi-
viduals do not have counsel is palpable because the whole structure of the
adversarial system is to get the two sides to come forward with their best sto-
ries.  When one side is debilitated by a lack of counsel, the risk of getting to
an inaccurate result increases.  This matters because of the cost of
incarceration.
If the judge mistakenly determines the parent-debtor will not pay, as
opposed to being unable to pay, that individual goes to prison.  That incar-
ceration comes with an incredibly large price-tag.  The average cost per day
of imprisoning one individual is about $50.339  In Turner’s case, he was
ordered to pay $51.73 per week (or $7.39 per day) in custody payments.340
At the time he was sentenced to a year in prison (a prison term that he served
in full), he owed $6000.341  That means the state of South Carolina paid
$18,250 in incarceration costs alone, and ultimately the state recovered not
one penny of the $6000 he owed.  Assuming the family court got it right, the
system already makes little sense economically.  In Turner’s case, however,
the court got it wrong.  Turner could not pay, and that mistake cost the state
338 See Earl Johnson, Jr., “And Justice for All” When Will the Pledge Be Fulfilled?, 47 JUDGES’
J. 5, 9 (2008); see also Robert L. Rothman, No House, No Custody, No Money, No Lawyer, 35
LITIG. 1, 2 (2008) (“Despite the best efforts of many judges to be as fair and impartial as
possible when they have a lawyer on one side of a case and a self-represented litigant on
the other, equal justice—or the appearance of equal justice—is elusive.”).
339 See Elaine B. Brown, Smart on Crime, RES GESTAE, June 2012, at 54, 51 (identifying an
“average $55-per-day-per-inmate cost to house”); JJ Hensley, Ariz. Aims to Cut Prison Costs; In
Texas, a New Approach, AZCENTRAL.COM (Apr. 18, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.azcentral.
com/news/articles/2010/04/18/20100418arizona-prison-costs.html (“Texas spent about
$3 billion in 2009 on its criminal-justice system, which included about $42 per day to house
the 172,000 prisoners in state custody.”); Meredith Kleykamp et al., Wasting Money, Wasting
Lives, DRUG POL’Y ALLIANCE 1, 7 (2008), available at http://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/
default/files/WMWL_Final_2012.pdf (estimating the cost of imprisoning an individual in
New Jersey at $46,880 per year); Benjamin Pearson-Nelson, Reentry Court Program Impact
Evaluation, ALLEN COUNTY COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS 1, 1 (2009), available at http://www.
allencountycorrections.com/pdfs/reports/ReEntry%20Court%20Impact%20Evaluation
%2002%2004%2009.pdf (estimating the cost of imprisoning an individual in an Indiana
state prison at nearly $53 per day); Budget: Inmate Cost Per Day Over Five Years, FLA. DEP’T OF
CORRECTIONS, http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/annual/0910/budget2.html (last visited Apr.
6, 2013) (estimating the cost per day of imprisoning an individual in Florida at $53.34 per
day in FY 2009–10).
340 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 225, at 8.  Imprisoning him for his daily payments cost
the state much more than it (or the custodial parent and child) stood to gain.  Thus,
incarcerating him for failing to pay makes dubious economic sense.
341 Id. at 11.
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in excess of $18,000.  Turner was just one individual in what is estimated to
be 139,000 parent-debtors in South Carolina who are in arrears for child sup-
port payments.342  Even if only a small percentage of those parent-debtors
are held in contempt and incarcerated, the risk of error—the risk of getting
the ability to pay determination wrong—is exceedingly high when compared
to the cost of providing attorneys in these proceedings.
In sum, under a straightforward application of Mathews, contempt pro-
ceedings like the one at issue in Turner should result in a finding of the
necessity of counsel every time.  The Court did not get there, however,
because instead of being guided by a consequence-driven approach that
would have required it to take note of both the complexity of the cases and
the inequities of the hearing dynamics, it adhered to its civil litigation narra-
tives.  This led it to mistakenly find that Turner was not deserving of counsel,
but was instead only deserving of more procedural safeguards.  In this case,
that meant more detailed forms to fill out.  This would not have been an
adequate solution in the criminal justice system, and there is no reason to
tolerate such a solution in the civil context either.  After all, prison is prison.
V. TAKING THE DOCTRINE-ORIENTED CONCERNS SERIOUSLY
If the Court rejects its traditional civil litigation narratives, and thus
rejects a doctrine-oriented approach, it will find that indigent individuals sub-
ject to prison in civil proceedings like Turner’s should receive counsel.
There are notable consequences of such a finding, however, that are worth
taking seriously.  This Part discusses the main concerns and concludes that
even though some of the concerns are valid, the Court’s most defensible
position is to adopt a consequence-driven approach and find that appointed
counsel is required.
A. Expense of Providing Lawyers
A state government paying to provide counsel is not a costless prospect.
One tempting response is to argue that the state need not pay for attorneys
because indigent defendants can depend on the Legal Services Corporation
(LSC) attorneys or private sector pro bono hours.  However, neither of these
suggestions provides the amount of representation necessary to meet the
needs of indigent individuals in civil litigation.  First, Congress continues to
cut funding for the LSC, and it is largely viewed as failing to provide the
services necessary to meet its modest original mandate.343  Second, while
342 See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2526 (2011).
343 Bindra & Ben-Cohen, supra note 9, at 4 (“Over the years, LSC, like many Congres- R
sional programs, has seen its funding cut.  For example, LSC’s 1999 funding was at $300
million, $21 million below the 1981 level and far below the $600 million that would be the
inflationary equivalent of the 1981 level.”).  In 1974, when the LSC was established, its goal
was to provide “at least ‘minimum access’” to indigent individuals, meaning one lawyer per
5000 indigents. S. REP. NO. 104-392, at 25 (1996) (statement of Sen. Simon).  As of 1996,
funding only covered one lawyer per 10,000 indigents. Id.  In 2007, that number was one
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attorneys are generally willing to provide pro bono assistance, they simply
cannot provide enough hours to meet the legal needs of indigent
individuals.344
Thus, the question becomes one of how federal and state governments
can afford to provide counsel, especially at a time when funding for public
programs is so scarce.345  First, the true cost of providing counsel is not a
simple calculation of how much a team of state attorneys will cost.  The sav-
ings to the system must also be factored in.  Child support is a perfect exam-
ple.  As explained above, a state like South Carolina spends enormous
amounts of money to imprison parent-debtors, with little to show for it in the
way of collection success.346  If the system functioned more efficiently
because of the addition of attorneys, then the true cost of a right to counsel
would be much smaller than anticipated.
Second, there is no empirical evidence to support the argument that a
right to counsel in civil contempt hearings would be significant.347  The Tur-
ner Court discussed the monetary cost of providing counsel during oral argu-
ment, inquiring as to whether such cost had been computed.348  Ultimately,
the Court did not explicitly address cost in Turner, but it still stated that the
addition of lawyers would cause delay and destroy the informality of the
state’s systems, an implication that costs would increase without any benefit
to the state.349  It did so, however, without any evidence to support its pro-
position.  In point of fact, the evidence to the contrary is quite substantial.
lawyer per 12,025 indigents. See Documenting the Justice Gap in America, LEGAL SERVS. CORP.
1, 20 (2009), available at http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/pdfs/documenting_
the_justice_gap_in_america_2009.pdf (4231 attorneys working for LSC funded organiza-
tions and 50,876,000 people living at 125% of the federal poverty line).  This puts the
United States well behind other modern democracies in funding legal aid. See Johnson,
supra note 338, at 7 (“The governments of many comparable industrial democracies such
as England, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Canada, New Zealand, and even Hong
Kong invest three to ten times more on civil legal aid as we do in the United States.”).
344 See Bindra & Ben-Cohen, supra note 9, at 5–6 (summarizing the inability of many R
states to meet the needs of indigent parties with pro bono hours).
345 In Gideon, the Court did not discuss in depth the cost of providing counsel, nor did
it discuss a host of other issues, including whether there were enough lawyers to fulfill the
assistance of counsel requirement. But see Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 56–58
(1972) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (noting the discussion of attorney supply and
demand).  The Court raised these issues, but did not solve them.  Moreover, it did not see
them as substantial enough to prevent the Court from making the right decision. See Abel,
supra note 45, at 535–36 (“The Gideon opinion itself does not indicate why the Court R
decided to recognize the right to counsel despite these issues.”).
346 See supra Part IV.D; see also Helaine M. Barnett, An Innovative Approach to Permanent
State Funding of Civil Legal Services: One State’s Experience—So Far, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
469, 470–75 (1998) (finding that it is possible for the funding of at least some legal services
to result in overall cost-savings to the state).
347 The Turner majority argued it would be.  Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2519
(2011); see Respondent’s Brief, supra note 297, at 56–57, 61.
348 Oral Argument, supra note 190, at *52, *59–60.
349 Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2519.
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Studies of legal services have generally shown that when counsel assists indi-
gent individuals, the overall cost to the system decreases.350
Third, society has to make difficult choices when it comes to the alloca-
tion of funds for programs.  Often, however, it appears that funds are
invested in interests that do not benefit the public at large.  Right to counsel
is no exception.  Putting the cost of provision of counsel in context demon-
strates that it pales in comparison to many of the other expenditures made at
the federal, state, and local level.351  These expenditures are important, but a
civil justice system that functions fairly and legitimately is invaluable.  To
some degree, societal interest in a well-functioning civil justice system should
trump other interests.  Public sentiment demonstrates that this prioritization
is an accurate one.  At least one study has shown that almost eighty percent of
the American public believes that they have a right to counsel if they are an
indigent party in a civil proceeding.352  The allocation of public funds should
ensure this perception is a reality.
Finally, the need for equalization in representation can possibly be met
by the excess of lawyers in our justice system.  It is no secret that the legal job
market has shifted greatly over the past decade.  The contraction in the mar-
ket means there are a number of well qualified attorneys that simply cannot
350 See Legal Services Corporation: Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin.
Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 59 (1999) (statement of John Pickering,
Member, American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent
Defendants) (“Legal service programs encourage the swift resolution of disputes with mini-
mum conflict; only about 10[%] of matters handled by programs are resolved through
litigation.”).  There are many explanations for this decrease.  One example is that the law-
yer or agency bringing the action is more likely to respond to another attorney than she is
to a pro se individual, meaning the parties will generally avoid litigation and its associated
costs. See Engler, supra note 9, at 91.  Engler argues, in the landlord/tenant context, that R
where tenants do not have counsel, landlords are more like to bring cases in court because
even when they put in little time, they “typically prevail, regardless of the quality of their
lawyer, the persuasiveness of their evidence, or the presence of a viable defense.” Id.
Engler argues that if counsel were provided tenants, landlords may be less likely to pursue
litigation because they are “not prepared to prevail in a true adversarial trial.” Id.  Pro se
parties also take additional resources from the system. See Urban v. United Nations, 768
F.2d 1497, 1499 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“The problem we face today—that of a pro se litigant
flooding the court with meritless, fanciful claims—is by no means new to this circuit.”); In
re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1259 (2d Cir. 1984) (discussing a pro se litigant’s filing
of over two hundred and fifty civil actions which were “pursued with persistence, vicious-
ness, and general disregard for decency and logic” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
351 For example, one scholar estimated that the amount of money necessary to properly
fund legal services for indigent individuals in the state of California was “miniscule” com-
pared to the $9.5 million dollar budget for MediCal and MediCare.  Earl Johnson, Jr., The
Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: An International Perspective, 19 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 341, 359
(1985).
352 Mary Deutsch Schneider, Trumpeting Civil Gideon: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 63
BENCH & B. MINN. (2006), available at http://www2.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2006/
apr06/gideon.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2013) (finding that 79% of citizens in a national
survey responded “yes” when asked whether a poor respondent would have a right to free
counsel if sued in a civil court).
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find jobs sufficient to pay off their mounting law school debt.353  There is
only one attorney for every 6861 people categorized as low income (com-
pared to one attorney for every 525 people in the general population).354
Thus the legal need is most certainly there.  The problem is that many law-
yers cannot make a living working for a population with so little means.  The
medical profession has dealt with this reality by creating programs that allow
doctors to go to areas of great medical need in exchange for the discharge of
school debt.  A similar program could be adopted in the legal context.355
There is not an unwillingness to serve the indigent market on the part of
lawyers; there is simply an inability to do so.  Providing financial incentives to
junior attorneys would go a long way toward bringing the necessary number
of attorneys into this area of need.356
B. Expansion Beyond Prison as a Consequence
Two opposing concerns arise from the argument that the right to coun-
sel should be extended whenever an individual’s liberty is at stake, whether it
be in the civil or criminal context.  The first is that if the right is extended in
one particular civil context, it might be extended to others.  In Turner, immi-
gration was the major concern.357  A related concern is that once there is a
right to counsel in the civil context, other rights, such as the right to a jury
trial, must necessarily follow.  On the other side of the spectrum is the con-
cern that extending the right to counsel to cases where liberty is at stake does
not go far enough.
353 There is a “surplus” of attorneys.  Catherine Rampell, The Lawyer Surplus, State by
State, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX, (June 27, 2011, 11:00 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.
com/2011/06/27/the-lawyer-surplus-state-by-state.
354 Abel, supra note 45, at 527. R
355 See, e.g., Gregory M. Zlotnick, One Day, All Americans . . . : Considering a TFA-Style
Lawyer Corps, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 971 (2010) (discussing the possibility of a lawyer
service program modeled on the Teach for America program).
356 See Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
869 (2009) (arguing for alternative reforms in order to deliver on the promise of access to
justice); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., If We Don’t Get Civil Gideon: Trying to Make the Best of the Civil-
Justice Market, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347 (2010) (articulating alternatives to providing
counsel in each civil case, such as broader access to self-representation tools).
357 See Respondent’s Brief, supra note 297, at 40–42.  The Court also took into account
a slippery slope argument made by the United States as amicus. See Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal at 31–32, Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507
(2011) (No. 10-10), 2011 WL 108380.  One of its major concerns was the expansion of
right to counsel into immigration cases. Id.  “The due process guarantee of fundamental
fairness does not mandate the appointment of counsel in [removal] proceedings, which
would be contrary to the judgment of Congress.” Id. at 32.  While the Court did not explic-
itly address this issue in its opinion, the potential expansion of the right to counsel into
other civil proceedings most certainly affected its ultimate resolution of the case. See
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 297, at 18 (applying the right to counsel to civil contempt
hearings “would blur the venerable distinction between criminal and civil contempt, invit-
ing extension of a host of criminal procedures to various civil cases, such as immigration
detentions”).
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In short, these concerns should not impact the arguments made in this
Article.  First, to the extent a civil proceeding results in the loss of liberty, this
Article argues that the right to appointed counsel should attach.  If an immi-
gration proceeding results in detention, then counsel should be provided.358
Second, the Court is perfectly capable of taking the “other rights” into
account separately.  This may mean some rights will be found in civil pro-
ceedings where they have not existed before, but it may also mean they will
not.  For example, when the Court found a right to counsel in Gault, it later
refused to find a right to a jury trial in juvenile detention cases.359  The Court
determined the concerns attendant to right to counsel cases—resource dis-
parities, accuracy concerns, etc.—were not at issue when determining
whether a jury trial was required.360  One may either agree or disagree with
the Court’s decision on that matter, but the point is that the Court was able
to carve out certain “criminal” rights from civil hearings, even when it had
granted the right to counsel.361
Finally, as for the argument that the right to counsel should be extended
even farther, it is simply beyond the scope of this Article.  While entirely sym-
pathetic to the argument that the loss of one’s home or essential possessions
can be more devastating than being incarcerated, this Article is arguing from
a slightly different vantage point.  The Article’s basic argument relies on the
premise that the Court uses different narratives in criminal and civil right to
counsel cases where liberty is at stake.  This is driven by the Court’s hostility
to civil litigation.  This Article contends that hostility should not apply when
state power is being used to take away an individual’s liberty.  Whether that
argument can be expanded to other rights like property is for another
day.362
358 See generally Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky:
The Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1461 (2011)
(arguing that the Court may have identified a broad right to counsel when immigration
proceedings may result in detention or deportation).  Kanstroom argues that Padilla v.
Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), may be read to create a right to counsel in civil deporta-
tion proceedings. Id. at 1505.  He uses the Padilla decision to challenge formal doctrinal
distinctions between the civil and criminal settings in which deportation, as a consequence,
may arise. Id. at 1505–06.
359 See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545–51 (1971) (rejecting the application
of the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial to juvenile proceedings).
360 Id. at 543–48.
361 Similarly, in the criminal context, the Court did not extend the right to counsel to
cases where monetary fines were the penalties. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373
(1979) (“Argersinger has proved reasonably workable, whereas any extension would create
confusion and impose unpredictable, but necessarily substantial, costs on [fifty] quite
diverse [s]tates.”).
362 Many scholars have, in fact, argued that because the loss of property or other essen-
tial possessions can be worse than a short criminal incarceration, counsel should be pro-
vided. See, e.g., Beverly Balos, Domestic Violence Matters: The Case for Appointed Counsel in
Protective Order Proceedings, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 557, 558 (2006) (arguing for
right to counsel for battered individuals seeking protective orders from domestic violence
because such individual liberty is at stake by virtue of the physical threat they face); David
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C. Quality of Lawyers
One major criticism of appointed counsel in the criminal justice system
is the quality of the lawyering.  This is a valid concern and one certainly apro-
pos to whether counsel should be appointed in civil proceedings.  Challenges
in the criminal justice system include attorneys with too many cases, lax qual-
ity and assessment standards for the attorneys, and a failure to fairly
represent the individuals.363  These same concerns will likely apply in the
civil context as well.  For example, in states where attorneys are provided to
indigent parent-debtors, these kinds of problems have been documented.364
Thus, the issues that arise in the criminal justice system will certainly obtain
in civil proceedings.
These challenges, however, cannot be used to deny an individual her
rights.  The inability of the government to execute on what is right should
not be used as an excuse for not making the decision that is both substan-
tively and logically correct.  Moreover, there is a difference in magnitude
between the needs in the criminal and civil context.  The amount of lawyers
necessary to address the needs of indigent defendants in this particular civil
context—where incarceration is the consequence—will be much lower than
the number of lawyers necessary for the entire criminal justice system.
Finally, solutions are being pursued in the criminal context, so there is no
Medine, The Constitutional Right to Expert Assistance for Indigents in Civil Cases, 41 HASTINGS
L.J. 281, 321 (1990) (“Deprivation of an indigent’s property rights . . . may be more signifi-
cant than a minor intrusion on an indigent’s liberty interest.”); Rothman, supra note 338,
at 1 (arguing that the loss of basic necessities can be worse than going to prison); Note, The
Indigent’s Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545, 554 (1967) (“Presumably the only
line which could be drawn within [the civil litigation] area would set a minimum on the
financial stake which would compel appointment of counsel.  Any such criterion ignores
the crucial factor of relative poverty; to a very poor man, fifty dollars may make a great deal
of difference.”). But see D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Eval-
uation in Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121
YALE L.J. 2118, 2118 (2012) (finding, in a preliminary study of the Harvard Legal Aid
Bureau in unemployment dispute cases, the offer of representation by the clinic had no
“statistically significant effect on the probability that unemployment claimants would
prevail”).
363 See supra note 46 and accompanying text; see also Brief for Law Professors Benjamin R
Barton & Darryl Brown as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 18, Turner v. Rogers,
131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (No. 10-10), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/publishing/previewbriefs/Other_Brief_Updates/10-10_RespondentAmCuLaw
ProfsBartonandBrown.authcheckdam.pdf (“Expanding the right to appointed counsel to
include child support enforcement proceedings will only exacerbate the problems facing
this overburdened system [in the criminal justice context].”).  But, these concerns are not
necessarily endemic.  In other words, there are many success stories within the criminal
justice system as well. See Barton, supra note 46, at 1230 (noting that in spite of “distres- R
sing” facts and anecdotes about criminal defense attorneys, there were also a number of
spectacular, dedicated attorneys as well).
364 Patterson, supra note 104, at 139 (noting that researchers observing the use of R
appointed counsel in child support contempt hearings believed that the lawyers were just
meeting, or had just met, their clients before the hearing).
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reason to think that those same solutions (and successes) would not apply in
the civil context as well.365
D. Efficacy of Child Support Collection
It is debatable whether contempt is an effective means of collecting child
support from the poorest parent-debtors.366  Some states, like Illinois, are re-
examining the use of contempt hearings in their overall assessment of how
best to collect child support.367  There are other ways to make sure that chil-
dren are cared for that do not require jailing non-custodial parents.  The
suggested reforms are beyond the scope of this Article, but they include get-
ting rid of the welfare-recovery systems and replacing them with a system that
365 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. R
366 Hatcher, supra note 207, at 1031–32 (2007).  Notably, “half of the $105 billion in
national child support debt is owed to the government rather than to children.” Id. at
1029; see also Family Policy and Practice Brief, supra note 192, at 25 (“The child support
field itself has come to recognize that the accumulation of large arrearages by low-income
fathers is counterproductive to program goals.”); Patterson, supra note 104, at 97 (“[Incar- R
ceration of parent-debtors] is a social failure because it does little to generate child support
payments, and it increases the economic marginalization of the persons whose economic
success is critical to achieving the goals of the program.”). But see Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.
Ct. 2507, 2526–27 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that some states report success
in using incarceration and civil contempt in child support collection efforts); Respondent’s
Brief, supra note 297, at 7–8 (arguing that non-custodial parents opt out of work to avoid R
paying support, making the threat of prison an effective tool in collecting support).  In a
survey done by the federal government, eighteen states responded to say that they use
incarceration when necessary and that it works. Id. at 7.
367 Patterson, supra note 104, at 132 (“Mandatory contempt laws . . . should be modi- R
fied to allow an assessment of the defendant’s means for reaching program goals prior to
the filing of a contempt action.”); see also Hatcher, supra note 207, at 1073 (finding that in R
Title IV-D cases in 2006, the federal government determined that for the $354 dollars per
case it spent administratively to collect child support, it recovered roughly $363 per case);
Turner v. Rogers Anniversary Forum: Fundamental Fairness and the Ability to Pay in Child Sup-
port Proceedings, ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, http://events.r20.constantcontact.com/
register/event?oeidk=a07e5xnwsuk54634bab&llr=vt7m85dab (last visited Apr. 6, 2013)
(discussing a webcast from 2012 co-sponsored by the Office of Child Support Enforcement
and Department of Justice’s Access to Justice Initiative concerning the effects of Turner).
Illinois studied the effectiveness of its overall contempt system, including the use of incar-
ceration, and found that other methods might work better. Id.  For example, in 2010 in
Illinois, courts issued 5,960 orders to show cause. Id.  Of those orders, 3000 made it to a
court hearing and 791 of those 3000 made a subsequent payment. Id.  These efforts recov-
ered $520,000 in support payments, but cost the state $835,000. Id.  Notably, the $835,000
estimate did not even include the cost of incarcerating any individuals who violated their
child support orders, so the actual cost was even higher. Id.  The stark reality of how
poorly the contempt systems work has led many states, like Illinois, to re-think how they
approach child support recovery efforts. It implemented an early intervention system. Id.
The state agency workers were asked to delve into the parent-debtor’s ability to pay at the
outset, instead of setting unreasonable payment expectations that would inevitably lead to
court proceedings. Id.  This has significantly decreased the amount of cases referred for
contempt from 500 cases per month in 2010 to 122 per month in 2012. Id.
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is more proactive in determining what amount indigent parents can really
pay, helping parent-debtors better understand how to have their payments
modified, and finding ways to more accurately assess what the parent-debtors
can pay.368
But, even states that have adopted different systems use contempt spar-
ingly.369  Failure to pay child support is a nuanced issue, and what policy is
best should be left to the policymakers and further study.  A consequence-
driven approach will require, however, that if contempt and the threat of
prison is the best policy choice, the system should provide attorneys to indi-
gent individuals as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
Where an individual’s liberty is at stake, the system should do all it can to
ensure fairness prevails.  This premise is the basis for the Court’s landmark
Gideon decision.  Yet, when the same situation is presented in the civil as
opposed to the criminal context, the Court allows its hostility toward civil
litigation to color its analysis.  Instead of reaching a just result when the same
circumstances present, the Court uses a doctrine-oriented approach to reject
counsel for indigent individuals who are incarcerated.  The Court’s approach
is indefensible.  Instead of allowing the narratives of traditional litigation to
affect its analysis, it should be guided by the consequences of the proceeding
before it.  Where the individual is subject to incarceration and indigent, she
should have a right to appointed counsel, regardless of the nature of the
proceeding.  Indigent individuals and the greater public know that prison is
prison.  The time has come for the Court to face the same reality.
368 See Hatcher, supra note 207, at 1082–85; Patterson, supra note 104, at 107–15. R
369 See supra note 367. But see Margaret M. Mahoney, The Enforcement of Child Custody
Orders by Contempt Remedies, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 835, 853 (2007) (“[T]he entry of remedial
orders in custody and visitation enforcement proceedings serves to strengthen the judicial
system.”).  Moreover, according to Mahoney, the private interests—or the best interests of
the child—are served as well. Id.  However, Mahoney did not separately address the issue
of contempt orders in the context of indigent parent-debtors, and her support of the civil
contempt remedy was in the broader context of violations of parenting plans (including
the failure to turn the child over to the other parent under such a plan).
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